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Executive Summary 
 
Introduction  
AKI is a clinical syndrome (not a condition) that is ‘common, harmful and costly’.1-4 It refers to 
a rapid reduction in kidney function and is a marker of illness severity.2 There are many 
causes though in the majority of cases, AKI occurs as part of an episode of acute illness, 
such as flu or gastroenteritis.2 5 Targeting Acute Kidney Injury (AKI) has become a global 
priority for improving patient safety and offers the potential to achieve the triple aim of 
improvements to ‘care, health and cost.’   
A new international classification system for AKI was introduced in 2012 with the primary 
goal of driving the delivery of evidence based high quality care. In England, its introduction 
built on findings from the National Confidential Inquiry into Patient Outcome and Death 
(NCEPOD) report on AKI.6 This report highlighted hospital failings in patient safety in terms 
of poor assessment of acute illness with delays in the recognition of AKI, with evidence that 
around one in five of episodes of AKI were avoidable.  
The NCEPOD Report directly led to the introduction of a range of national initiatives 
including: NICE guidelines and quality standards to support the prevention, detection and 
management of AKI; an NHS England Patient Safety Directive mandating the 
implementation of an AKI alerting system within all NHS Acute Foundation Trusts; and a 
NHS England Commissioning for QUality and INnovation (CQUIN) incentive framework to 
improve post-AKI discharge care.5 7-9  
Research objectives and approach 
The aim of this research was to develop an in-depth understanding of the work required 
within two hospital trusts to improve the identification and management of AKI. Both trusts 
are large urban teaching hospitals serving mixed demographics. They both provide specialist 
renal services regionally.  
The research focused on exploring the work required in each organisation to introduce an 
AKI alerting system and embed it with associated care processes.  
Key objectives were to:  
1. Describe and understand the quality improvement (QI) approaches adopted within 
each hospital to improve the identification and management of AKI;  
2. Understand how adoption decisions are related to organisational context; and  
3. Understand how the planned AKI work unfolded in each hospital over time according 
to the different QI approaches adopted and the different organisational contexts.  
The research entailed a comparative ethnographic approach, undertaking extensive 
participant observation and interviews in each site (Hospital X and Hospital Y) over a 22-
month period from November 2015 to September 2017. The approach taken should not be 
taken as a strict comparison of the different processes undertaken in two different 
organisations. This research did not evaluate the effectiveness of the quality improvement 
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approaches adopted within each trust and the methodology used is not appropriate for any 
conclusions to be drawn about which approach was more ‘effective’ in affecting clinical 
outcomes. Rather, through comparative methods it aimed to enhance understanding of the 
work undertaken and negotiated in translating AKI policy initiatives into everyday practice. 
Findings 
 
Both Trusts reported notable successes against key process and outcome targets in the 
management of AKI. To achieve this, they both sought to capitalise upon the mandatory 
introduction of an AKI alerting system as a means to formalise existing work within each 
organisation. Though employed differently, both hospitals drew upon Institute of Health 
Improvement (IHI) methods for QI.  
Hospital X adopted a ‘collaborative’ approach that sought to make AKI ‘everybody’s 
business’ and incorporate learning into day-to-day working routines by bringing together 
representatives of 11 wards, for five learning sessions spread over a 17-month period 
concluding with the creation of a ‘change package’ and a final event to spread improvements 
hospital-wide. The approach was based upon their established systematic and strategic 
approach to QI that was informed by IHI collaborative methodology but adapted for use in 
the organisation. In addition, compared with Hospital Y, Hospital X had an established 
integrated electronic patient record. 
 
Hospital Y adopted a ‘change agent’ approach, with the AKI improvement programme 
delivered through the work of nurse specialists. This approach was informed by a decision 
taken by Hospital Y to use their internally developed AKI alert which in testing had proven to 
be more sensitive than the national alert. The QI work was based upon key personnel in 
Hospital Y having participated in a 12-month programme of IHI informed improvement 
education in order to design a programme of work around AKI. Small scale pilots were 
conducted in order to demonstrate potential savings and secure the permanent employment 
of two specialist nurses.  
Though the hospitals adopted contrasting approaches to AKI improvement, comparative 
analysis illuminated common tensions and trade-offs relating to the identification and 
management of AKI.  The differences lay in how each hospital negotiated these challenges 
in order to implement an AKI alerting system to improve process and health outcomes. 
Overall, there was a general tension between policy requirements to implement new 
interventions to improve AKI-related care and the resources allocated to achieve this.  
The NHS England AKI e-alert comprises a ‘detection’ phase, based upon an algorithm 
installed in laboratory management information systems, and an ‘alert’ phase, which 
communicates the findings to relevant clinical teams. The potential for over- and under-
diagnosis directed the work of each site in adapting the introduction of the AKI e-alert to the 
organisational and human resources at their disposal.  
Hospital X adopted the national algorithm for the detection phase and dedicated substantial 
work to integrate the alert phase into the electronic patient record. This required sustained 
input from IT systems experts, clinical leads and QI team over a period of around 12 months. 
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The role of the participants in the collaborative was to develop a reliable system for 
responding appropriately to the alert and embedding it within the care process bundle. 
Hospital Y had already put IT systems expertise and time into the development of their 
locally developed alert, which they trialled alongside the national alert and found it to be 
more sensitive, eradicating under-identification. The specialist nurses were involved in both 
the detecting and alert phase: firstly, to conduct daily monitoring of detected cases and 
correcting any over-identification; secondly, communicating this alert to ward teams, through 
electronic systems, backed up by person- and paper-based systems, and prompting the 
initiation of a care process checklist. 
Both approaches brought their own distinct benefits and challenges. A key benefit to the 
collaborative approach was the opportunity it afforded to develop changes that were situated 
in an in-depth examination of everyday practices, by a sample of relevant practitioners. The 
collaborative was successful in achieving its primary objective of developing a change 
package that comprised a set of practical steps for introducing changes at local team level. A 
key challenge was the sustained commitment of a relatively large number of people to the 
programme, in the face of ongoing resource pressures. Both the initial programme and the 
plan for spreading the change package had to be modified in light of resource pressures and 
their effects upon the continued engagement of participants in the programme. 
A key benefit of the change agent approach was the dedicated human resources of time and 
expertise it mobilised in successfully addressing the introduction of a ‘failure proof’ detection 
system, hospital-wide. A key challenge was the concentration of expertise among so few 
people and the ongoing resource dependency this created. Through the handover of 
information, the nurse specialists had to negotiate boundaries to do with 
specialist/generalist, and nurse/doctor orientations, and in doing so, overcome a lack of 
familiarity between the specialist nurses and the various hospital teams.  
Only Hospital X adopted the voluntary national CQUIN for AKI. The CQUIN had the effect of 
bringing discharge onto the agenda of the organisation. However, though the CQUIN targets 
were met, tensions were evident between the top-down, procedural approach of the CQUIN 
and the bottom-up and exploratory approach of the collaborative. Its introduction disrupted 
and reduced the degree of ‘exploration’ that was possible through use of QI methods (i.e. 
process mapping). There were also reports of a ‘drop off’ in QI engagement once the CQUIN 
tasks were met.  
Across both hospitals there was limited evidence to suggest that patients were aware of or 
understood the significance of AKI as part of their episode of illness. There were limited 
attempts to integrate patient perspectives into AKI improvement; patient narratives framed 
the start of collaborative learning sessions in Hospital X. They functioned as a way of 
enrolling clinical staff into the programme and situating ‘basic’ care processes and practices 
within ‘real’ experiences.  
Conclusions  
Our findings have illuminated a number of tensions and trade-offs inherent to the attempt to 
improve quality in public organisations. Before moving to a discussion of these tensions, we 
first briefly summarise key findings, guided by our original research objectives: 
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1. Describe and understand the quality improvement approaches adopted within each 
hospital 
 
The two approaches adopted by the two organisations in this research were: a ‘collaborative’ 
approach (Hospital X) and a ‘change agent’ approach (Hospital Y). Both approaches 
mobilised approaches developed by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, incorporating 
SMART objective setting, process mapping, and Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycles. At the 
outset of our data collection, Hospital X was at the ‘initiation’ phase of their improvement and 
Hospital Y was at the ‘spread’ phase. 
 
These two approaches exemplified a distinction between ‘exploratory’ and ‘exploitative’ 
innovation.10 Exploitative innovation entails ‘exploiting’ existing products or ways of working 
to enable incremental improvement, while exploratory approaches entail learning anew in 
order to open up potentially radical innovation. Exploitative approaches have the advantage 
of building upon what is known or has been successfully demonstrated. Exploratory 
approaches have the advantage of opening up a specific activity for detailed examination, in 
so doing aiming to illuminate key ‘blockages’, which once resolved can have transformative 
effects beyond the immediate domain of interest. At the same time the exploratory approach 
requires the organisation to accept a greater risk associated with uncertainty of outcome.10-12  
 
2. Understand how adoption decisions are related to organisational context 
 
The successes of both the ‘collaborative’ and ‘change agent’ approaches to quality 
improvement depended largely on their ‘institutional fit’. Organisations that seek to replicate 
the success of these organisations should give careful consideration to the local 
characteristics of their organisation and its similarity to the two hospitals described in this 
report.  
This contextual fit was also expressed through the manner in which the organisational 
context and the improvement materials themselves together shaped the approach taken. 
The materials upon which the improvement programmes in each site were based; that is, the 
national AKI alert and care process bundles developed locally from national guidelines. Two 
examples illustrate this point: 
 1. The AKI alert has the potential to result in both over- and under- identification of 
AKI. Both hospitals invested resource to address this. Hospital Y used their pre-existing work 
on an alert system to eradicate all under-diagnosis, while Hospital X accepted the 
inaccuracies of the national algorithm but exploited their digital capabilities in embedding the 
alert into decision prompts for ward teams. The Hospital Y ‘failsafe’ approach was enabled 
by the dedicated resource of the AKI nurses. In the absence of these resources the Hospital 
X system relied instead on an IT decision support system that was embedded within ward-
based teams.  
 2. The Hospital X bundle was developed by and for ward-based teams. It was 
designed iteratively in combination with tests of change. It was printed on a small card and 
used an acronym in order to attempt to embed both the process to follow and the ward-
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based practices and routines through which this process would operate. The Hospital Y 
checklist was also the product of iterative development over time, however, its content and 
use were shaped by the need for it to become a ‘boundary object’, that is a material means 
of managing the transfer of care from the specialist nurses to ward-based teams. As a result, 
the checklist contains more specific information about what needs to be done and by which 
staff, and has checkboxes to enable documentation and audit. 
3. Understand how the planned AKI work unfolded in each hospital over time 
 
Both sites encountered barriers to improvement associated with resource constraints and 
with the lack of understanding and knowledge of AKI among staff. These barriers required 
adaptation on the part of both organisations, with each programme evolving distinctly in 
response to context specific challenges. In spite of challenges, both organisations reported 
considerable success against their core aims within the evaluation timeframe. 
 
In Hospital X, the collaborative programme required the engagement of staff from eleven 
wards over a prolonged period of time. Resource constraints left wards with less effective 
capacity to release staff to engage in improvement work, which resulted in a reduction of the 
time commitment that was requested by the programme leaders, and a re-shaping of the 
ongoing plans for spreading improvements. Uncertainty about AKI could exacerbate this 
challenge, sometimes resulting in lower levels of engagement from those clinical areas 
where there were competing opinions about whether or not AKI should be an improvement 
priority. 
 
In Hospital Y, the programme of improvement had initially been shaped by resource 
constraints, with the Board requirement to have potential savings demonstrated prior to 
investment being committed to fund the resource upon which the programme was built; the 
AKI nurse specialists. Uncertainty about AKI led to the team encountering initial resistance to 
their attempts to increase awareness and support staff in managing AKI. This drove the 
approach to provide one-on-one support through education and the iterative development of 
the care process checklist in collaboration with ward-teams. 
 
Tensions & Trade-offs 
There is an overarching tension illuminated by our research between policy requirements to 
improve identification and management of AKI and the resources allocated to achieve this. 
This relates to a persistent assumption among policy makers and opinion leaders that 
improvement to care can be achieved in a ‘resource neutral’ manner, by ‘improving value’; 
identifying waste and improving efficiency.13-15 Our research suggests that even when this 
might be possible, it takes substantial work, and therefore resource, to identify waste, 
develop and embed alternatives, and realise efficiencies. This assertion is supported by a 
recent review of QI collaboratives, which found positive results in terms of the effectiveness 
of collaboratives in achieving against their core aims, with significant reduction against at 
least one primary target in 83% of cases, whilst also noting that: ‘A collaborative is a 
complex and time-consuming intervention for clinicians, teams and sites and represents 
major financial, organisational and political investment’.16 
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The challenge of maximising benefits while minimising additional burden was apparent 
across three related tensions underpinning AKI improvement work carried out in the two 
hospitals:  
 
1. Resourcing the work required to maximise the clinical utility of AKI whilst minimising 
additional burden: 
 
National guidelines and approaches for AKI have a core objective of reducing 
avoidable harm.5 9 However, embedding AKI, as an effective driver of patient safety, 
into routine care without creating additional  workload for clinical staff or burden for 
patients requires sustained work. Any approach to introducing an AKI alerting system 
must consider the mobilisation of dedicated resources towards identifying and 
correcting the potential for under- and over- diagnosis.  
Consideration should be given to how this work can be made more visible at the 
organisational level to guide resource planning and prioritisation of improvement 
objectives. At the system level, policy and guidance also requires a realistic 
understanding of this work, such that there is an attempt to make new approaches 
adaptable to the contexts in which they are to be embedded. 
2. Resourcing exploratory approaches to QI in order to improve care and reduce costs: 
 
Research suggests that programmes that attempt to simultaneously improve ‘care, 
health and cost’ require systematic and flexible processes for planning, initiation and 
completion of improvement work.13 14 It is also acknowledged that the simultaneous 
achievement of all three aims should not be expected of individual programmes, but 
rather accrue over time.14 Exploratory and collaborative work require the deployment 
of considerable resources prior to the potential demonstration of benefits. Cost 
savings in particular might have to be deferred well beyond the lifetime of individual 
programmes.  
This implies that there is a greater degree of uncertainty associated with cost 
savings, which must be borne as a risk in QI planning. In resource scarce contexts 
there is a danger that considerations of cost could exert a greater influence upon QI 
planning and resourcing decisions, which is likely to disincentivise more exploratory 
approaches.17  
We suggest that greater attention is needed to the question of how prioritisation 
occurs within different organisations and how design decisions are made within 
particular programmes with respect to each element of the IHI Triple Aim. 
3. Integrating collaborative ‘bottom up’ approaches to learning and improvement with 
performance driven ‘top down’ incentivised targets: 
 
Target driven performance incentives such as CQUINs can be effective in mobilising 
resources and clinical interest around particular areas of care. However, CQUINs can 
direct attention towards attainment of a target rather than attention to the underlying 
processes to which the target relates, resulting in a ‘tick box’ approach.18 Our findings 
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demonstrate the benefits of approaches which involve an open examination of 
practices and processes from the ‘bottom up’ (through process mapping, for 
example).  
This requires an attempt to give QI work space and time in order to develop 
adaptable solutions to problems as they are uncovered and to not allow an isolated 
set of targets to narrow the potential focus of QI work.  
4. Integrating alternative perspectives into QI.  
 
Approaches to QI benefit from the meaningful involvement of a broad range of 
stakeholders in identifying population needs, developing objectives, and developing 
learning and outcomes.14 In practice this is very difficult to accomplish because it 
requires additional resources, not only financial, but also time to engage and include 
multiple perspectives. Hospitals such as the two under examination in this report are 
also complex and formally structured organisations. They are situated within a 
fragmented policy environment which can mitigate against collaboration across group 
and organisational boundaries.19  
We draw examples of two groups for whom there a strong case for greater 
involvement in AKI QI work in secondary care; patients and primary care. 
The limited involvement of patients in QI activities generally is a recognised problem. 
Our findings reveal specific challenges related to attempting to engage patients with 
AKI into improvement work: the lack of recognition of AKI even among those who 
have had an episode of care complicated by it; the wide distribution of AKI across 
many different patient groups; and the resulting difficulty generating a collective 
identity and shared interest around AKI upon which to develop more inclusive 
approaches to improvement. 
The limited extent to which primary care was considered and incorporated into the 
improvement work of either site means that further work needs to be done in order to 
improve communication and transition across the interface between acute and 
continuing care. AKI can appear and reappear within the illness narratives of patients 
over many years, each time potentially requiring attention to questions of temporary 
medicine cessation and possible hospitalisation. Our findings illuminate some of the 
complexities of discharge processes for patients with AKI, however, this was neither 
one of the core aims of the programmes examined here, nor their evaluation. This is 
an area requiring further research. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, public healthcare budgets worldwide have 
faced sustained cuts. In the English National Health Service, the projected funding gap 
requires savings of £22 billion by 2020.20  At the same time global opinion leaders in quality 
improvement, such as the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) couple patient safety 
with the need for continuous improvement and suggest that all organisations should be able 
to achieve improvements in ‘care, health and cost’ (the so-called ‘triple aim’).13 21 However, 
attention is needed to the question of whether this is achievable, particularly for 
organisations facing sustained reductions in funding alongside increasing levels of 
complexity and demand.  
 
There is some evidence of policy being mobilised in order to grapple with this problem. In the 
UK, the Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) programme was launched in 
2011 to encourage innovation through service redesign and more recently, NHS England 
has launched its campaign for ‘new models of care’ and ‘sustainability and transformation 
plans’.22 23 Substantial investment has been directed at health informatics and technology as 
a means to improving care and cost, through the development of more automated and 
standardised care processes.24 However, previous research suggests that the 
implementation of new technology is not simple, and requires work within organisations in 
order to make sense of and embed changes.25-27  
This report examines the implementation of new approaches to improve the identification 
and management of Acute Kidney Injury (AKI) in two NHS hospitals, part of two different 
NHS Trusts. This new approach comprised a new classification system, a diagnostic e-alert, 
and a minimum standard care process bundle.2 9 28 Drawing upon existing frameworks for the 
introduction of new approaches into health care practice, we explore the possibilities for 
action afforded by the new approaches to identification and management of AKI and the 
work required for practices to be adapted to them.29 30 
Targeting AKI is now a global priority for improving patient safety and health outcomes.2 31 
AKI is a clinical syndrome (not a condition) that is ‘common, harmful and costly’.1-4 It refers to 
a rapid reduction in kidney function and is a marker of illness severity.2 There are many 
causes though in the majority of cases, AKI occurs as part of an episode of acute illness, 
such as flu or gastroenteritis.2 5 That is, it is often the combined result of infection, low 
circulatory blood volume (hypovolaemia), low blood pressure (hypotension) and medication 
effects resulting in a reduction in kidney perfusion and filtration.2 5 32 AKI is identified on a 
scale of severity from Stage One (least severe) to Stage Three (most severe).2 AKI is 
estimated to complicate between 5 to 6% of all hospital admissions and around 1 in 5 
unplanned hospitalisations.3 4 33-35 AKI is more common in elderly patients with 
multimorbidity, living with multiple complex health and social care needs.2 5 35-38 It is of 
particular relevance to patients with pre-existing chronic kidney disease and/or those with 
cognitive decline reliant on carer support for maintaining fluid intake during an acute illness.2 
5 7 Viewed as a ‘force multiplier,’ hospital AKI-related care is estimated to cost 1% of the 
NHS budget and AKI is associated with poor health outcomes in terms of high rates of 
rehospitalisation, further episodes of AKI, development or progression of CKD, and mortality 
both in the short and long term.1 2 5 33 35  
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A new international classification system for AKI was introduced in 2012 with the primary aim 
of driving the delivery of evidence based high quality care.2 In the UK, its introduction built on 
findings from the National Confidential Inquiry into Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD) 
report on AKI from 2009.6 It highlighted hospital failings in patient safety in terms of poor 
assessment of acute illness with delays in the recognition of AKI and evidence that around 
one in five of episodes of AKI were avoidable.6 The NCEPOD report resonated with findings 
from the Francis Inquiry and the Berwick Review, both of which shed light upon, and 
provided recommendations to address gaps in care quality occurring in Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust.6 21 39 40  
 
In this context, tackling AKI has emerged as a national priority to improve care quality.5 NICE 
guidance was published in August 2013 leading to quality standards to support the 
prevention, detection and management of AKI.5 7 Within NHS England’s Patient Safety 
Domain, the Think Kidneys Programme was established, entailing multidisciplinary work 
streams to improve AKI-related care across settings both within hospital and in the 
community.41 Through Think Kidneys, NHS England published two national patient safety 
directives:  A mandatory Level 3 NHS England Patient Safety Directive came into effect in 
March 2015 that requires all NHS Acute Trusts and Foundation Trusts to implement a 
computerised AKI alert to support earlier recognition and response to AKI; followed in 2016 
by a Level 2 Patient Safety Directive requiring all NHS providers to ‘develop an action plan’ 
to ‘improve local systems and processes for the care of patients with AKI’.9 32 42 43  
 
Identified as having the ‘biggest potential impact in reducing premature mortality,’ sepsis and 
AKI were specified as the two clinical priorities central to improving patient safety and 
realising the vision for high quality care set out in the NHS England Five Year Forward 
View.23 44 Fifteen Patient Safety Collaboratives were established across England in response 
to the Francis Inquiry and Berwick Review with nine of the Collaboratives forming a cluster to 
address patient safety through the lens of AKI (AHSN, 2016, KSS AHSN, 2016). In 
secondary care, national levers for driving improvement have included the introduction of the 
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) incentive framework. In 2015-2016, 
CQUINs for both sepsis and AKI were introduced to ‘incentivise quality and efficiency’ and 
included ‘goals’ for improving discharge summaries for patients who had a hospital 
admission complicated by AKI.8 45 46   
 
It was in this global and national context that the two hospitals that feature in this report 
sought to improve the quality of AKI-related care. Using in-depth ethnographic methods, this 
evaluation aimed to understand approaches to quality improvement (QI) to support the 
delivery of high quality care. The focus of our report is upon the implementation of two 
programmes of improvement, based upon the introduction of the AKI e-alert and care 
processes. We examine the work required to embed changes within everyday care 
processes, drawing on the distinction between ‘work as imagined’ and ‘work as done’ to 
illuminate the tensions and trade-offs that exist between the formal and ascribed purpose of 
                                                
 http://www.kssahsn.net/what-we-do/better-quality-and-safer-care/acute-kidney-
injury/Pages/National-AKI-Cluster.aspx 
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new approaches, and the reality of introducing and embedding changes within complex 
organisational environments. 26 47   
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2. Research objective and approach 
 
The aim of this research was to develop an in-depth understanding of the work required 
within two hospitals to improve the identification and management of AKI. We focus upon the 
different QI approaches adopted within each trust, to understand how adoption decisions are 
related to organisational context, and how the planned work unfolded in each trust over time.  
Key objectives were to examine the introduction of new approaches for the identification and 
management of AKI (classification system, e-alert, care bundle) in order to: 
1. Describe and understand the quality improvement (QI) approaches adopted within 
each hospital to improve the identification and management of AKI;  
2. Understand how adoption decisions are related to organisational context; and  
3. Understand how the planned AKI work unfolded in each hospital over time according 
to the different QI approaches adopted and the different organisational contexts.  
The hospitals under study both mobilised aspects of the QI methodologies set out by the 
Institute of Health Improvement (See Section 2.1 for detailed description). However, both 
took different approaches and used them in different ways.  Hospital X adopted a Break 
Through Series collaborative approach (hereafter: ‘collaborative’), while in Hospital Y a 
change agent’ approach was taken through the employment of AKI specialist nurses, 
combined with an IHI informed programme of system redesign.  
The data collection adopted an ‘ethnographic’ approach, which is a longitudinal qualitative 
method originating in the discipline of anthropology and now widely used in applied research 
across many different disciplines.48 We collected data between November 2015  and 
September 2017 undertaking extensive observation of relevant events and activities and 
conducting interviews with healthcare professionals, QI experts and managers involved in 
the implementation process, as well as patients who had received care in either one of the 
two sites. The longitudinal approach enabled the development of an in-depth perspective of 
QI developments, behaviours and actions within each organisational setting over time. The 
research focused on the underlying contextual factors influencing the development and 
implementation of the two improvement strategies within the different hospital settings at 
stake.  The period of data collection and the activities undertaken by both hospitals are 
summarised in Figure 1. This shows that the research period coincided with the roll out of 
the AKI Bundle in Hospital Y and with the collaborative activity in Hospital X.   
While there is a greater recognition of the importance of understanding how and why 
interventions work, the role of the underlying context and its relationship with improvement 
programmes is still a relatively new area of investigation.49 The use of ethnographic research 
proves particularly helpful in developing an understanding of context that goes beyond the 
somewhat static understanding of organisations and their structures, to instead explore the 
unfolding manner in which the ‘how’ questions of improvement are tackled with regards to 
specific attempts to introduce new approaches.29 The use of a comparative approach 
allowed us to bring to light the different work required in two different sites in order to 
translate externally developed approaches into organisational practices. Accordingly, we 
structure our analysis drawing upon the distinction between ‘Work as Imagined’ and ‘Work 
as Done’.26 50 Work as imagined refers to the ideals and assumptions that are embedded 
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within new policies and approaches to providing care, and work as done refers to the 
adaptive work that is required in organisations in order to introduce changes and embed 
them into routine practice. In complex organisational environments, such as health care, this 
adaptive work might take considerable time and energy, and require the negotiation of 
locally specific challenges. Understanding organisations as continually engaged in multiple 
adaptive processes at any one time signifies the importance of developing suitable and 
sustainable adaptations to particular problems.   
The approach to examine the different processes underway in two different organisations 
was intended to draw out the differences between the two organisations, the approaches 
they adopted, and the work undertaken to translate ideals into actions. This approach should 
not be taken as a strict comparison, rather we sought to describe the series of translations 
and trade-offs negotiated in making plans work in practice. The research did not evaluate the 
effectiveness of the quality improvement approaches adopted within each trust. Rather, 
through comparative methods it aimed to enhance understanding of the work undertaken 
and negotiated in translating AKI policy initiatives into everyday practice. The methodology 
used is not appropriate for any conclusions to be drawn about which approach was more 
‘effective’ in affecting clinical outcomes. 
Data collection comprised observation of QI activities and qualitative interviews with key 
personnel in each site. Ethical approval was required in order to interview patients as part of 
the study, and this was obtained in November 2015. Data collection commenced 
immediately in both sites thereafter, concluding in September 2017 (see Figure 1). 
Observations were unstructured and were focussed upon capturing a descriptive record of 
events and situating these within both the organisational and external context. Interviews 
were semi-structured and were used to capture first-person accounts of the development 
and implementation of the programmes in each site. Patient interviews were unstructured 
and were used to develop an understanding of the place of AKI within an individual’s own 
ongoing narrative of health and illness. A summary of data collection is provided in Table 1 
Table 1 Data collection 
 Hospital X Hospital Y 
Observations (days) 28 9 
Interviews (total) 24 25 
   Managers 6 7 
   Nurses 4 9 
   Pharmacists 0 1 
   Patients/Family carers 6 3 
 
2.1 Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) Methods 
The IHI was established in the early 1990s and was initiated by a QI group led by Dr Don 
Berwick. Over time it has developed an approach described as a ‘science of improvement’, 
‘that emphasises innovation, rapid-cycle testing in the field, and spread in order to generate 
                                                
 The differences in observation days reflects the different approach taken to QI and the different phase of the 
programme at which each trust was during data collection. As Hospital X had a collaborative programme ongoing 
at the time of data collection, there were more activities to observe, whereas in Hospital Y the programme was 
based mainly upon the work of two individuals working one-on-one to spread improvements hospital-wide. 
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learning about what changes, in which contexts, produce improvements’. IHI’s methodology 
is based on organisation science, which suggests that by adhering to certain principles, 
organisations can increase quality and simultaneously reduce costs. In recent times this 
principle was incorporated into what the IHI refer to as the ‘Triple Aim’; to improve ‘care, 
health and cost’.13 
IHI has advocated several specific methodologies, all of which incorporate several core 
principles:  
 A clear aim supported by a measurement framework 
 A clear description of content and causal pathway from changes to outcomes 
 A clear execution strategy 
 Rapid testing and learning through Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycles 
 Understanding of systems through process mapping 
 Use of time-ordered data across different locations 
 Application of behavioural and social science 
In this study, Hospital X adopted a ‘breakthrough collaborative’ approach: a ‘short-term (6- to 
15-month) learning system that brings together a large number of teams from hospitals or 
clinics to seek improvement in a focused topic area.’51 Hospital Y’s approach involved a 
team including a renal consultants, pharmacists and  AKI nurse specialists in a 12-month 
programme of externally delivered IHI informed education (see Figure 1). 
  
                                                
 http://www.ihi.org/about/Pages/ScienceofImprovement.aspx  
 http://www.ihi.org/about/Pages/ScienceofImprovement.aspx  
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Figure 1. Timeline for development, implementation and evaluation of QI AKI interventions  
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3. Context & Intervention 
 
3.1 National and Regional Context 
Between 2013 and 2016, three national AKI initiatives were introduced in England. They 
comprised: NICE guidelines and quality standards to support the prevention, detection and 
management of AKI; an NHS England Patient Safety Directive mandating the 
implementation of an AKI alerting system; and a NHS England CQUIN to improve post-AKI 
discharge care.5 7 9 45  
 
3.1.1 NICE Guidance and Quality Standards 
Findings from the NCEPOD Report (2009) directly led to the Department of Health 
requesting NICE to develop a guideline on AKI.5 40 The NICE guidelines were published in 
August 2013 and were primarily intended to support the delivery of care by non-specialist 
clinicians working in a range of settings. The guidance highlighted a need for early 
intervention and emphasised ‘the importance of risk assessment and prevention, early 
recognition and treatment’. Key priorities for implementation outlined in the NICE clinical 
guidelines , informed the publication of NICE Quality Standards in 2014 and the subsequent 
launch of Clinical Process Measures by Advancing Quality in 2015.5 7 In December 2015, the 
NHS England Think Kidneys programme recommended implementation of a care bundle for 
patients diagnosed as having AKI.28 Without intending to replace care bundles developed 
locally, Think Kidneys provided guidance on the minimal requirements for hospitals to meet 
national recommendations on the management of AKI.43   
 
Table 2 NICE Standards, AQ Process Measures, and Think Kidneys Care Bundle 
NICE  
Quality Standard for AKI 
(QS76) 
2014 
Advancing Quality  
AKI  
Clinical Process Measures          
20151 
Think Kidneys 
Core Elements of initial    
AKI Care Bundle 
2015 
Statement 1: People who 
are at risk of acute kidney 
injury are made aware of the 
potential causes. 
Statement 2: People who 
present with an illness with 
no clear acute component 
and 1 or more indications or 
risk factors for acute kidney 
injury are assessed for this 
condition 
Statement 3: People in 
hospital who are at risk of 
acute kidney injury have their 
serum creatinine level and 
urine output monitored. 
Statement 4: People have a 
urine dipstick test performed 
as soon as acute kidney 
injury is suspected or 
detected. 
AKI-01 Urine Dipstick Test 
within 24 hours of 1st AKI 
Alert 
 
AKI-02 Stop Angiotensin 
Converting Enzyme (ACE) 
inhibitor and Angiotensin 
Receptor Blockers (ARBs) 
within 24 hours of 1st AKI 
Alert 
 
AKI-03 Serum creatinine test 
repeated within 24 hours of 
1st AKI alert 
 
AKI-04 Ultrasound scan 
within 24 hours of first alert 
 
AKI-05 Specialist 
renal/Critical Care 
Discussion within 12 hours of 
Initial Assessment 
ABCDE as assessment 
(follow NICE CG50) 
Observations – check NEWS 
score 
Look for signs of sepsis 
Abdominal palpation looking 
for full bladder 
 
Initial Treatment 
Prompt treatment of sepsis 
(start Sepsis Six care 
bundle) 
Fluid challenges if 
hypovolaemic/hypotensive 
Medication review 
Stop potentially harmful 
drugs 
Check for dose adjustments 
in AKI 
Relieve obstruction (see 
                                                
1
 http://www.aquanw.nhs.uk/resources/advancing-quality/AKI-poster.pdf  
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NICE  
Quality Standard for AKI 
(QS76) 
2014 
Advancing Quality  
AKI  
Clinical Process Measures          
20151 
Think Kidneys 
Core Elements of initial    
AKI Care Bundle 
2015 
Statement 5: People with 
acute kidney injury have the 
management of their 
condition discussed with a 
nephrologist as soon as 
possible, and within 24 hours 
of detection, if they are at 
risk of intrinsic renal disease 
or have stage 3 acute kidney 
injury or a renal transplant. 
Statement 6: People with 
acute kidney injury who meet 
the criteria for renal 
replacement therapy are 
referred immediately to a 
nephrologist or critical care 
specialist. 
 
1st AKI 3 alert 
 
AKI-06 Give patients written 
self-management information 
prior to discharge 
 
AKI-07 Pharmacy 
medication review - data 
collection measure only 
guidance)  
 
3.1.2 NHS England AKI Alert 
In March 2015, NHS England published a Level 3 Patient Safety Directive 
(NHS/PSA/D/2014/010) requiring a national AKI detection alert to be installed in the 
laboratory information management systems (LIMS) of all NHS Acute Trusts and NHS 
Foundation Trusts.9 The detection alert is based on the KDIGO (2012) classification system 
for AKI.2 The NHS England Think Kidneys Programme published best practice guidance 
emphasising that the generation of an AKI e-alert is a two-step process:  
1. Detection of an acute change in serum creatinine producing an AKI Warning Stage 
Test Result through implementation the national AKI Algorithm and then;  
2. An alerting phase entailing communication of AKI Warning Stage Test Results to 
clinicians.32  
 
The NHS England Think Kidneys Best Practice Guidance acknowledged local resources and 
capabilities may vary and that ‘due to the volume of work’ it may not be necessary for 
laboratory staff to prioritise which AKI Warning Stage Test results are telephoned to 
clinicians (i.e. ‘may only be possible for stage 2 and 3 or stage 3 only’). It was recommended 
the stage of AKI and timeliness in communication needed to be ‘determined by local 
governance/risk assessment and within the Trust’s overall AKI response; any resourcing 
issues may need to be discussed with commissioners.’32    
 
3.1.3 National CQUIN for AKI  
Through the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework, financial 
incentives were introduced in April 2015 to improve discharge care for patients who had a 
hospital admission complicated by AKI.45 There are two types of CQUIN, those disseminated 
nationally and adopted on a voluntary basis by individual providers, and those adopted by 
Clinical Commissioning Groups and mandatory for member providers within the CCG area. 
The CQUIN for AKI was national, and provider adoption was therefore voluntary. The 
CQUIN goal was ‘to improve the follow-up and recovery’ and in doing so, reduce both the 
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risks of rehospitalisation and long-term cardiovascular risk through medicines optimisation. 
Recognising the ‘financial challenges facing the NHS in 2015/16’, the CQUIN for AKI aimed 
to ‘incentivise quality and efficiency’ through ‘transformation across care pathways that cut 
across different providers.’45  
 
For patients managed in an acute hospital, payments were made for documentation of four 
key items on their discharge summary:  
 
1. Stage of AKI (a key aspect of AKI diagnosis);  
2. Evidence of medicines review having been undertaken (a key aspect of AKI 
treatment);  
3. Type of blood tests required on discharge; for monitoring (a key aspect of post 
discharge care);  
4. Frequency of blood tests required on discharge for monitoring (a key aspect of post 
discharge care).  
 
The CQUIN for AKI lasted from April 2015 to March 2016. Payments for achievements were 
weighted over the four quarters of 2015/16, with a 50% of the whole-year AKI CQUIN value 
being made available to participating Trusts for ≥ 90% of the required items being included in 
the discharge summarise in the final quarter (Q4).45 
 
3.2 Local Context & QI Approaches 
Both hospitals are large urban teaching hospitals serving mixed demographics. They both 
provide specialist renal services regionally across a patient population of approx. 1.5-1.8 
million people each. The hospitals adopted contrasting approaches to AKI improvement: 
Hospital X adopting a ‘collaborative’ approach, and Hospital Y adopting a ‘change agent’ 
approach through employment of specialist nurses. However, there were similarities as well; 
both hospitals drew upon Institute of Health Improvement (IHI) methods, though they 
employed these differently (See Section 2.1). Both programmes also contained very similar 
material elements; the AKI alert and the stepped processes of AKI care based upon NICE 
and Think Kidneys guidance.5 32 Both hospitals sought to capitalise upon the mandatory 
introduction of the AKI alert as a means to formalise and focus work that had been on-going 
within each organisation for a number of years. This is an important consideration when 
evaluating the extent to which these programmes can be reproduced in other contexts. We 
begin with a summary of the programmes (Table 3) before describing each site in more 
depth and situating the approach adopted within local organisational contexts (see also 
Figure 1). 
 
3.2.1 Hospital X: Collaborative approach 
Between 2012 and 2013 a group of clinicians interested in AKI formed a multi-disciplinary 
working group to consider approaches to improving the care of patients with AKI, involving a 
wide sample of clinical and managerial stakeholders across the trust. Hospital X had a 
systematic and strategic approach to QI that was well established prior to the initiation of the 
AKI programme. Each year the strategy involved identifying specific clinical priorities. 
Following the inclusion of AKI in the hospital’s improvement priorities, the group became 
more formalised. A case for establishing a QI collaborative for AKI was approved in 2014 
and, following this, two members of the hospital’s QI team – as well as key managerial and 
technical personnel – were incorporated into the working group. Between November 2014 
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and May 2016, the group met fortnightly and monthly thereafter up until mid-2016 when 
meetings became less frequently, happening roughly bi-monthly. 
Hospital X’s distinctive ‘improvement culture’ – a set of norms, values, and ‘ways of doing 
things’ – was recognised widely both within and outside the organisation. This was of critical 
importance to the collaborative approach, which required engagement and ongoing time 
commitments from a relatively wide range of stakeholders. The hospital had conducted 
many successful collaboratives in the past and often had several operational at any one 
time, and this was integral to the manner in which the organisation as a whole operated. The 
collaborative was based on IHI collaborative methods but it had been adapted for use in the 
organisation and members of the working group believed its use made the organisation 
distinct from other hospital trusts. The collaborative approach was based upon incorporating 
learning into day-to-day working routines and there was an expectation that this would lead 
to sustainable changes to working practices once the programme finished.  
The QI programme managers invited staff from 11 participating wards to take part in a 
collaborative in five ‘learning sessions’, which were held between August 2015 and 
December 2016. The collaborative days brought together key members of the working 
group, ward nurses, ward managers, as well as pharmacists and on occasion junior doctors, 
to hear presentations about AKI improvement and share the strategies they were employing 
within their clinical areas. The collaborative was aimed at developing a ‘change package’. 
When complete, the change package would be a singular document detailing the steps to be 
taken to bring about improved management of AKI in each ward and clinical area across the 
hospital.  
The collaborative learning sessions were initially delivered over a full day (10am-4pm). 
There were six learning sessions in total, concluding with the launch of the change package 
and the handover of this from phase one to phase two (spread phase) of the collaborative.  
The sessions typically began with a patient story presented by one of steering group’s 
clinical leads. The rest of the session was then usually led by one of the QI leads, who were 
non-clinical, and were highly trained and experienced in QI methods–. Each learning session 
consisted of three types of activities: 
 ‘Programme’ elements, concerning the discussion and monitoring of aims, objectives 
and targets; 
 ‘Education’ elements, consisting of presentations of information (on for example AKI, 
IHI methodology, pharmacy, IT systems) by the QI leads, the clinical leads, or other 
members of the working group;  
 ‘Participation’ elements, where participants were encouraged to discuss problems, 
ward systems, and tests of change with the room at large as well as in small group 
work. 
In the first session the QI team presented an overview of the IHI methodology, and then a 
detailed overview of how this was being translated into a plan for the programme, including 
aims and a flow diagram to envisage how these might be achieved across different work-
streams. The majority of the afternoon was group work involving open discussions based 
upon the central objective of ensuring appropriate actions (i.e. implementation of the care 
bundle) following an AKI e-alert.  
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The care bundle drew directly upon the NICE and AQ stepped care processes (See Section 
3.2). It included a summary guide for some of the steps as well as signposts to more detailed 
guidance from NICE and Think Kidneys in order to proceed through initial and ongoing 
assessment and possible escalation. AKI is not limited to one area of a hospital or one 
clinical specialism. It happens to patients being treated for a broad range of other primary 
diagnoses. The wards and clinical areas selected in Phase 1 were based on those with the 
most AKI cases covering a spectrum of hospital services and specialities and were assumed 
to have distinct local routines, procedures, and needs. This meant that whilst the clinical 
response to AKI was to be the same throughout the hospital, its implementation had to be 
adapted to the specificities of different ward systems and routines, types of patients, and 
clinical practices. A critical part of the collaboratives’ methodology was the notion of ‘tests of 
change’. These were small, practical techniques that the wards involved in the collaborative 
would develop iteratively through Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycles, which occurred in 
between the learning sessions. Whether successful or not, tests of change were shared at 
the collaborative events through which they would be reviewed and modified, or abandoned. 
It was through the tests of change that the care bundle was to be embedded in day-to-day 
ward practices. 
A key test of change was the incorporation of AKI into the ‘safety huddle’ onto one ward – a 
twice daily meeting at shift changeover wherein safety concerns were discussed. During the 
first round of the PDSA cycle (i.e. PDSA1), nurses used the huddle to highlight patients with 
AKI and indicate their stage. Throughout, PDSA1 safety huddle testing underwent a number 
of tests of change.  At PDSA2 they added the care process bundle for AKI, highlighting 
aspects that remained to be completed. This test was eventually incorporated into the 
change package, as one stage out of six (See Figure 2 below). The safety huddle therefore 
became one of the central components in tying together the alert response to the 
appropriate care process.   
Figure 2: Hospital X Change Package 
1. AKI score highlighted by coordinator 
2. AKI patients discussed via safety huddle 
3. Nurse communicates with medical team 
4. Care process bundle 
5. Pharmacy Review 
6. AKI education 
Figure 3: Hospital X Care Process Bundle 
1. Urine dipstick test within 24 hours of 1st AKI alert 
2. Stop ACE inhibitors and ARBs within 24 hours of 1st AKI alert 
3. Serum creatinine test repeated within 24 hours of 1st AKI alert 
4. Ultrasound scan of urinary tract within 24 hours of 1st AKI alert 
5. Specialist renal or critical care discussion within 12 hours of 1st AKI alert 
6. Written self-management information prior to discharge  
7. Pharmacist medication review within 24 hours of 1st AKI alert 
3.2.2 Hospital Y: Change Agent Approach 
In 2011, Hospital Y launched an internal audit of AKI services against the NCEPOD report 
findings, showing significant deficiencies in AKI detection and care, which led to the 
formation of the Acute Kidney Team in 2013 (see Figure 1). The team was multidisciplinary, 
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consisting of three nephrologists, an intensivist, an acute physician, a part-time renal nurse 
specialist, a renal pharmacist and an IT business intelligence developer, who worked 
collaboratively on designing an improvement framework and IT system to manage AKI. The 
team reported directly to the newly created AKI Steering Group which provided quarterly 
reports to the Trust Board through the medical director. The Steering group and Working 
group established a business case for an AKI nurse specialist with plans to implement the 
locally developed AKI e-alert system.   
Between 2014 and 2015, Hospital Y undertook a 12-month programme of IHI informed 
improvement education, which key personnel in Hospital Y used in order to design a 
programme of work around AKI. The intervention developed was tested using a factorial 
design on 4 wards. Funding was agreed for two AKI nurse specialists during this period. As 
such, at the time the national alert was made mandatory across the NHS, Hospital Y was 
already undertaking a project to devise an alert. Instead of relying on the standard national 
alert, Hospital Y decided to use their internally developed alert, which in testing proved to be 
more sensitive than the national alert, mandated by NHS England. In 2015, following this 
programme, the initial interventions were introduced through hospital-wide interventions of 
education and awareness events and a pilot study conducted across four wards. The idea 
was to test various combinations of improvement activities, through PDSA cycles in order to 
produce a set of interventions that could be spread hospital-wide. The appointment of two 
AKI nurse specialists in March 2015 supported the move towards the spread of the 
intervention hospital-wide. 
Figure 4: Hospital Y Care Process Checklist 
1. Ascertain baseline creatinine 
2. Identify cause for AKI 
3. Perform fluid assessment 
4. Investigate for cause and consequences 
5. Consider catheterisation 
6. Renal and bladder ultrasound scan 
7. Consider referral to renal 
8. Fluid balance charts 
9. Perform urine dipstick 
10. Perform drug review 
Figure 5: Hospital Y Change Package 
1. AKI Alert analysed and picked by AKI Nurse 
2. Review of AKI patients by the nurse 
3. Nurse communicates with medical team/nursing/pharmacy team 
4. Care process checklist implemented  
5. Pharmacy Review 
6. AKI education 
7. AKI patients followed till they recover  
Table 3: Local QI programmes 
 
Hospital X: Collaborative Hospital Y: Change Agent 
Aim To improve the identification and 
management of AKI in secondary 
care through an adapted IHI 
Breakthrough Series Collaborative  
To improve detection of AKI in 
secondary care through the 
development, refinement and 
implementation an e-alert system, but 
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Hospital X: Collaborative Hospital Y: Change Agent 
also employment of AKI nurse 
specialists (change agents) to facilitate 
improvement in awareness and 
management with the help of a 
checklist.  
Objectives:  Integrate safety alert into 
electronic patient record 
 Develop and implement online 
learning package for AKI for 
clinical staff 
 Establish collaborative in order 
to develop and implement ‘care 
bundle’ for AKI 
 Development of hospital-based 
locally developed e-alert system  
 Simultaneous implementation of 
national alert (as comparator for 
locally developed AKI e-alert)  
 Implement learning from 12-month 
improvement programme 
 Hospital-wide spread of 
improvement from successful pilot 
studies on four wards  
Methods  Process mapping to visualise 
current system and identify 
threats to achievement of 
reliable care process 
 Collaborative learning days 
involving representatives of 
wards with highest incidence of 
AKI (5 sessions over 17 
months) 
 Collaborative tests of change in 
PDSA cycles, in between 
learning days 
 Development of ‘change 
package’ to design and embed 
care process bundle 
 Change package to 
subsequently support hospital-
wide spread 
 A team including clinical leads and 
AKI nurse specialists completed 
12-month IHI informed QI training 
to design new system 
 Process mapping to visualise 
current system and identify 
potential barriers to introduction of 
new systems 
 New system piloted, with PDSA 
cycles, checklist developed, and 
interventions tested using factorial 
design on 4 wards. 
 Spread supported by development 
of ward-based care process 
checklist, supported by AKI nurse 
specialist 
 Spread further supported by 
education and training sessions 
delivered by nurse specialists 
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Resources 
(human & 
physical) 
 QI and NIHR CLAHRC GM 
teams both with expertise in 
IHI methodology and prior 
experience managing BTS 
collaborative approach; 
 QI collaborative team 
comprising QI lead, project 
manager and clinical lead 
 AKI working group involving 
leaders from all relevant areas 
of the trust (regular meetings) 
collaborative participants to 
represent 11 wards for six 
learning sessions 
 One learning session 
requiring one full day release 
from ward duties, and five 
learning sessions requiring 
one half day release from 
ward duties; 
 Electronic patient record and 
IT system expert to integrate 
with AKI alert 
 Digital learning platform and 
e-learning systems specialist 
 QI collaborative approach 
embedded in organisation-
wide reporting systems 
 Formation of an Acute Kidney 
Team, initial work on alert 
development, 0.5 FTE nurse 
specialist employed on AKI project 
 Steering group and working group 
established and business case for 
AKI specialist explored and plans 
for implementing the alert 
developed 
 Acute Kidney Team took part in IHI 
informed QI training programme 
checklist developed, and 
interventions tested using factorial 
design on 4 wards.  
 Two full time AKI nurse specialists 
required throughout design and 
spread phases 
 Ongoing support from AK team 
(clinical specialists, managers, lead 
nurses, IT) 
 IHI-informed QI training delivered 
by external consultant 
 In-house e-alert developed over 
~12 months by IT/clinical team 
 Oversight of programme by 
steering committee reporting to 
board 
Modifications 
made to 
programme: 
 Participation in learning 
sessions challenged by 
resource constraints, leading 
to these being cut from whole 
to half-day each 
 Numbers of participants within 
each group reduced over time 
due to same constraints, led 
to disengagement of some 
areas and greater input 
required from QI team and 
working group in development 
prior to spread of change 
package 
 Locally developed e-alert designed 
to ‘over identify’ AKI, with daily 
monitoring by specialist nurses to 
‘correct’. 
 Specialist intervention encountered 
initial resistance from wards. 
Education and training delivered 1-
1 in wards due to low attendance 
at learning sessions 
 Checklist developed over time for 
completion by ward staff with all 
cases of AKI 
 Daily ward rounds of specialist 
nurses required to embed changes 
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4. Findings 
In this section we begin by providing a summary of the outcomes reported by each 
programme, before moving to a description of the unfolding experience of implementation in 
each site. To reiterate, the research was not focused on evaluating the effectiveness of the 
quality improvement approaches undertaken within each hospital. Rather, through use of 
ethnographic methods, the evaluation aimed to enhance understanding of the work 
undertaken in translating AKI policy initiatives into routine practice.  
 
We provide a more detailed examination of the two key material dimensions of the QI 
programmes: the AKI e-alert and the care bundle, with a comparison of the approaches 
taken in each trust. We then consider the role of the CQUIN, discharge processes and the 
relationship with primary care, before concluding with a discussion of the role of patients in 
shaping these improvement efforts. In each case we draw out the key challenges and 
opportunities created by the introduction of these policy materials and mechanisms and 
explore the trade-offs that occurred with implementation and rationalisation at the 
organisational level. We highlight the role of organisational context as instrumental in both 
the success and challenges that the two programmes faced.  
4.1 Outcomes 
Table 4, below provides full details of process and outcome measures reported by each 
trust, the targets set for each and the results attained. Where no data has yet been made 
available this has been indicated with ‘no data’. 
Table 4: Local process and outcome data 
Hospital X 
Measure Type Definition Target Baseline 
(August 
2015) 
Outcome 
(August 
2017) 
Care 
Process 
Bundle 
Process See Figure 2, 
Section 3.2.1 
95% 
compliance 
No data 
provided 
Data not yet 
available 
Medicine 
Cessation 
Process Stop ACE 
inhibitors and 
ARBs within 
24 hours of 
1st AKI alert 
95% 
compliance 
No data 
provided 
52.4% 
hospital-wide 
Serum-
creatinine 
Process Serum-
creatinine 
test repeated 
within 24 
hours of first 
AKI alert 
95% 
compliance 
No data 
provided 
71.3% 
hospital- wide 
Medication 
review 
Process Pharmacist 
medication 
review within 
24 hours of 
1st AKI alert 
95% 
compliance 
No data 
provided 
45.2% 
hospital-wide 
                                                
 The evaluation team was not responsible for the collection of the quantitative data cited here. This data is drawn 
from the internal evaluations conducted by each hospital, which have been published and are in the public 
domain, but which have not been cited here to protect anonymity. In the case of Hospital X, process data limited 
to collaborative wards only was not yet available, so hospital-wide figures have been used. 
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Hospital X 
AKI 
Incidence 
Outcome Proportion of 
AKI cases in 
all 
admissions 
10% 
reduction 
212 277 (no 
statistically 
significant 
change) 
Incidence of 
Hospital 
Acquired AKI 
Outcome New cases of 
AKI 
developed in 
hospital 
25% 
reduction 
115 per 
month 
96 per month 
(16% 
reduction, 
22% 
reduction on 
collaborative 
wards) 
Progression 
of AKI 
Outcome Proportion of 
patients who 
progress 
from AKI 
Stage One to 
either Stage 
Two or Three 
50% 
reduction 
49% 
progression 
to Stage Two 
(27%) and 
Stage Three 
(21%) 
No change 
(48% 
reduction on 
collaborative 
wards) 
 
Hospital Y  
Measure Type Definition Target Baseline 
(March 
2015) 
Outcome  
(August 
2017) 
AKI 
Detection 
Process Proportion of AKI cases 
appropriately 
diagnosed within 24 
hours 
95% 
attainment 
47% 100% 
Fluid 
Assessment 
Process Proportion of AKI 
patients with 
documented fluid 
assessment and charts 
95% 
attainment 
40% 93% 
Drug Review Process Proportion of AKI 
patients with a 
documented 
appropriate drug review 
95% 
attainment 
48% 95% 
Adherence to 
AKI priority 
care 
Process Proportion of AKI 
patients in whom nine 
elements of the 
checklist were adhered 
to (see Figure 3) 
80% 
attainment 
67% 84% 
AKI 
incidence 
Outcome Proportion of AKI cases 
in all admissions 
10% 
reduction 
9% 6.5% (28% 
reduction) 
Incidence of 
Hospital 
Acquired AKI 
Outcome New cases of AKI 
developed in hospital 
10% 
reduction 
40% 28% (30% 
reduction) 
AKI Length 
of Stay 
Outcome Average number of 
days AKI patients 
spend in hospital 
10% 
reduction 
22.1 days 17 days 
(23% 
reduction) 
AKI Days Outcome Average number of 20% 15.5 days 9.3 days 
                                                
 When all aspects of the checklist were bundled then the overall compliance was 20%, due to poor performance 
with urine dipstick. Table shows results with urine dipstick excluded. 
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Hospital Y  
days a patient remains 
in AKI after diagnosis 
reduction (40% 
reduction) 
AKI Deaths Outcome Count of deaths with a 
diagnosis of AKI 
10% 
reduction 
38 35 (8% 
reduction) 
Dialysis/ 
Haemofiltrati
on for AKI 
Outcome Count of AKI patients 
requiring dialysis/ 
haemofiltration 
10% 
reduction 
13.5 15 (no 
statistically 
significant 
reduction) 
 
The Hospital X improvements were driven by the introduction of the AKI alert, the launch of 
the collaborative programme, the development of the process to achieve compliance with 
the bundle, and an online educational programme. The Hospital Y improvements were 
driven by the introduction of the AKI alert, the employment of two full time AKI nurse 
specialists, the development of the checklist, and, the hospital wide education and 
awareness programme delivered by the nurse specialists. In both sites, these components 
were developed iteratively and over a considerable period of time. Our detailed findings 
below describe the process through which this development took place, focussing upon the 
obstacles encountered and strategies developed to overcome these. 
 
4.2 Implementation overview 
 
4.2.1 Hospital X: Collaborative Approach 
Due to the multifaceted nature of the programme and the need to embed learning into 
existing working routines across the organisation, the objective to make AKI ‘everybody’s 
business’ was a complex undertaking. The first of the six collaborative learning sessions 
were split between a morning and afternoon session and took-up the whole working day. It 
began with a patient narrative delivered by one of the QI leads – a story about an individual 
with a combination of chronic and acute conditions that brought them into an extended, 
episodic and at times critical contact with acute care. The story was explicitly intended to 
evoke an emotional reaction and to instil a sense in the audience of the importance of 
improving the management of AKI and the effect it would have on patient care. There were 
no financial incentives attached to participating in the programme for the ward staff. The 
steering group was aware that the success of the collaborative relied on the attitudes of staff 
and that nurses truly cared about their patients and the quality of care in the hospital. The 
staff were therefore encouraged to participate in the programme via the notion that AKI was 
indeed a serious problem for patients and patient stories were presented at the beginning of 
each collaborative day as a way of drawing a relationship between practical changes the 
audience was being asked to make and the emotional realities of care. These patient 
narratives continued to feature at the start of learning sessions throughout the majority of the 
17-month programme. They are common to most collaboratives that are run within the 
organisation, and they also feature in board meetings. 
The following collaborative days were based on a similar format. The main task for the 
collaborative was to work out ways to implement the various elements of the care bundle in 
different clinical areas. This meant that whilst the programme was developed in advance, the 
strategies for realising the programmes aims (the tests of change) were developed in 
collaboration between the ward staff and the steering group managers. The tests of change 
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made the collaborative innovative and allowed its methodology to be adaptable to local 
idiosyncrasies. This form of adaptability was intended to give the staff a sense of ownership 
over the intervention and to ensure any improvements were embedded in ward routines. 
Latter collaborative events also included sessions where successful tests of change would 
be shared, or where encouraging data that showed some drop in the progression or 
prevalence of AKI would be celebrated, and any successes attributed to the audience. 
As the programme progressed however, the trust began to experience a period of increased 
organisational pressure, caused by financial pressures which led to reduced workforce 
capacity and challenged the ability to release staff to attend learning sessions. Whilst this 
was only mentioned in passing during the formal collaborative events, in private, members of 
the working group expressed concern that competing priorities (such as patient flow) and 
problems associated with trust-wide workforce capacity might have a negative impact on the 
collaborative work. At the end of the second learning session there was concern among the 
QI team that morale was low and so it was agreed that key members of the working group 
would start doing ‘walk-arounds’ in between learning sessions to try and encourage and 
maintain engagement. 
Individuals within the programme highlighted the challenges created by external resource 
constraints, which the QI leads felt went beyond those experienced in similar past 
programmes. Members of the working group expressed concerns about the challenges 
facing the intervention and raised issues such as poor attendance at collaborative meetings, 
modest engagement from some staff, and staff being moved from the wards involved in the 
collaborative. There were additional challenges with competing priorities, such as Hospital X 
joining a regional group, which involved moving QI managers over to other trusts temporarily 
to support the development of their improvement agendas. In response to these pressures, 
and the effect they were having on the amount of time the clinicians were able to dedicate to 
the collaborative, the QI team decided to shorten the collaborative events to half a day. This 
meant that in the latter collaborative events, the content of the meetings had to be carefully 
selected and much of what was included in the previous events – team building exercises, 
extended periods for sharing ideas and group discussion – was dropped from the agenda. 
This was in part a response to resource pressures and the reduced time available to learning 
sessions, which one of the QI leads noted reduced the time available for ‘reflection’.  
Individual attitudes of the staff involved in the collaborative were perceived by the QI team as 
a key component in the success of the intervention. As the programme did not include any 
financial incentives, its success relied on the notion that better AKI management was a 
matter of professional pride and about getting the basics of care (hydration, bloods, fluid 
balance) right. This drove the following assumptions: 1. the programme would be more or 
less ‘cost neutral’, and 2. the standardisation of practice would not cause additional work 
burden. Whilst this might have been the case with previous collaborative programmes, in a 
context of acute resource pressures, this rationale was challenged. Some nurses pointed out 
that there was increasingly little time from anything other than the basics of care within their 
day-to-day working routines. Nurses spoke about how standardising certain clinical practices 
did consume more time than would otherwise be the case and how taking time out from 
ward work to attend a collaborative could be a distraction from the delivery of basic care. 
Indeed, one nurse went as far as to claim that she had no time for the collaborative because 
she had to “prioritise patient care”. The challenge this posed to the rationale of the 
collaborative and how collaborative work was prioritised in relation to other clinical duties 
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was evidenced by falling attendance and decreased engagement as the programme 
progressed. These problems did not reflect a lack of individual will or effort, nor did it 
represent a failure on behalf of the QI team or working group. Instead, they were related to 
pressures that existed beyond the parameters of the programme. 
In light of the difficulties securing the attendance and engagement of staff throughout phase 
one, it was decided following the launch of phase 2 that this would not be organised around 
further learning sessions, but rather the change package would be presented to individual 
wards and teams in order to initiate the spread phase, which was planned to commence 
once the initial 17-month programme was complete. 
4.2.2 Hospital Y: Change Agent Approach  
The direct involvement of a senior consultant in the NCEPOD study was an important driver 
for Hospital Y to take action in relation to AKI. The iterative manner in which the intervention 
evolved through small pilots - as described above – effectively limited the number of 
stakeholders involved in delivering the intervention, and those deciding whether or not to 
further resource it. Positive pilot results, and evidence of reductions in mortality and bed 
days, was positively received at board level, and led to the intervention being supported 
through an increase in resources, including dedicated human resources. The multi-
disciplinary nature of the acute kidney team allowed the combination of various backgrounds 
and expertise to develop a hospital-specific AKI alert, and plan and roll-out the programme 
with largely internal resources. At the outset of the project, a team of five including the 
leading consultant and AKI specialist nurse attended external improvement methodology 
training, which ran alongside the AKI project and included mentoring and supported for the 
project. Senior management required some demonstration of impact prior to committing 
ongoing resources to the project, and this drove them towards a more formally structured 
approach centred upon creating and defining the roles of the AKI Specialist Nurses.  
 
The interest was initially driven by two renal consultants who were actively engaged in 
research activities on the topic and established the need to address the issue within the 
hospital. The main consultant established the need for leadership for executing the project 
beyond merely research and presented the idea to a newly appointed consultant to lead on 
the project, who engaged a multi-disciplinary team. The AKI team played an important role in 
facilitating and organising and implementing the programme. The Board initially required 
evidence that the resources requested were worth the investment, hence the need for the 
pilot and business case. The business case emphasised the degree to which existing 
resources were being exploited and drawing on the part-time and temporary work of one of 
the AKI nurse specialists., The AKI lead consultant went through a Trust leadership and 
management programme for newly appointed consultants, using the AKI project to develop 
and implement leadership skills through action-learning sets with peers and a facilitator. This 
went alongside the QI training undertaken by the whole team. The positive results of the pilot 
became a major turning point in receiving adequate funding for two AKI specialist nurses. 
The AKI specialist nurses, the key change agents, became not only symbolic to AKI 
improvement practices but also a motivator and benchmark for ward staff to evaluate their 
performance and AKI care practices. Over time the AKI specialist nurses became known 
across the hospital as “the Face of AKI” and as the main point of access for the AKI 
improvement work. However, this was not achieved without overcoming initial resistance 
from ward staff. Being described as “the face of AKI” was taken by the nurses, in part, to 
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imply a separation enacted by ward staff, between their ‘daily work’ and the ‘additional work’ 
that the specialist nurses were imposing upon them. This resonates with the experiences of 
the collaborative, described above, and the sometimes conflicted relationship between 
‘improvement’ and ‘basic care’. 
 
4.3 AKI Alert 
As noted above (Section 3.1), the AKI alert systems relied on the testing of bloods samples. 
If a potential case of AKI was detected in a pathology lab, an alert would be triggered, 
notifying a responsible clinician that a patient was at risk of developing an AKI. These two 
steps – the detection and the alert - provide a structure for examining the different 
approaches taken between the two sites, with Hospital Y intervening earlier in the process, 
in the ‘detection’ phase, and both sites adopting different approaches to the ‘alert’ phase. 
 
4.3.1AKI Alert: Hospital X 
Hospital X adopted the national algorithm for detecting potential cases of AKI from measures 
of serum creatinine, collected through routine bloods. In implementing the alert phase, there 
was considerable work undertaken within the working group in order to set up an effective 
electronic system which could be integrated into the electronic patient record (EPR). The 
steering group believed that the e-alert needed to trigger a tangible set of actions and 
interventions to halt the progression of AKI and provide clear advice to non-renal specialists 
about the referral pathway. The e-alert was integrated into the electronic patient record, 
appearing as a warning banner if the patient was believed to be having an AKI. In addition to 
the banner, a phone call from biochemistry to the ward where the blood sample had been 
taken was introduced for every new AKI Stage 3 (complying with Think Kidneys guidance).32  
Developing and then embedding the alert was initiated primarily via the working group and 
through meetings between working group members and hospital systems and IT experts. 
This required complex and coordinated care processes to be understood in its different 
stages. The process of integrating the alert into the EPR involved a systems expert 
developing and testing different approaches. Hospital X is known as a digital leader for its 
EPR, nevertheless, integrating the alert was a protracted and at times contested process. 
For example, an AKI checklist – a consecutive list of tasks to be completed for every 
suspected case of AKI – was developed and built into the EPR. The checklist would appear 
on the record of every patient suspected of having an AKI. The EPR made it possible for the 
checklist to be mandatory (in the sense that nurses would not be able to close a patient’s 
records until it was complete). However, the group decided not to make it mandatory for fear 
of adding to the bureaucratic burden faced by nurses in the day-to-day work. This created 
the problem of how to compel nurses to use the checklist. The EPR systems manager 
worked between the working group and nurses on the wards to develop a way of making the 
checklist as accessible as possible.  
Tensions such as this – between usability, effectiveness, and the work burden produced by 
adding new elements of the EPR – characterised not only the role of the EPR but also other 
aspects of the collaborative programme. In discussion about the EPR, the concept of ‘alert 
fatigue’ was often raised.52 53 Alert fatigue described risk of nurses and other clinicians 
becoming so used to alerts appearing on patient records for so many different reasons that 
they no longer afforded them sufficient attention.  
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Embedding the alert required an in-depth examination of ward practices. Once care 
processes had been mapped-out, and potential problems highlighted, it was possible to 
envisage how the alert might take place in real time and to develop practical techniques 
aimed at ensuring the process was reliable; this drove the focus of the collaborative. 
Through a series of tests of change, a process was laid out involving the identification of an 
AKI coordinator in each ward, inclusion of AKI reviews in handovers, and documented 
process for communication between nurses and medical teams. This process was reached 
incrementally over several months and tested in different wards and was eventually 
integrated with the care bundle, as described further below.  
Just as the alert triggers an automated alert, so this process was designed to trigger a set of 
actions, communications, and documentation. However, the fallibility of the alert itself, in 
under- and over- identifying patients, allows a greater degree of human error in the process. 
This is something that the Hospital Y approach sought to address, as we describe next.  
4.3.2 AKI Alert: Hospital Y 
Prior to the introduction of the mandated alert, Hospital Y had a system for identifying 
potential cases of AKI in development for some time. When the mandatory alert was 
introduced, Hospital Y adopted this and ran it alongside their existing system. This allowed 
them to use the national system as a benchmark for the accuracy of their own. When they 
found both over- and under-identification in the national system, they chose to make their 
own system more sensitive, leaving them with more over-identification than the national 
system, but eradicating under-identification. This work took place over a 1-2 year period and 
involved regular consultation between members of the AKI steering group, and IT systems 
experts, much of which occurred prior to this evaluation taking place. Using their own 
system, Hospital Y estimated a prevalence of approximately 5% over-identification.  Against 
this, they observed approximately 10% under-identification of true AKIs using the national 
system, while still also producing false positives.  
 
In contrast to Hospital X, Hospital Y did not have a fully functioning EPR, so it was unable to 
embed the alert phase in the same way. This resulted in them adopting a different approach 
to the second part of the system; the communication of the alert to clinical staff. This is 
because from the point at which the alert had detected possible AKIs, the system employed 
in Hospital Y was much more heavily reliant on people- and paper-based systems. The 
system that emerged over several weeks and months of trialling was that the two specialist 
nurses would monitor the output of the alert every day, and firstly check for any over-
identification. This gave them a dedicated resource with which to undertake the necessary 
‘repair’ work on the alert. The nurse would then attach stickers to the notes of each AKI 
patient, with stickers colour coded to alert nurses, doctors and pharmacists to relevant 
sections (much like the EPR alert looked different to different members of staff at Hospital 
X). The nurse specialists then undertook daily ward rounds in order to communicate directly 
with nursing and medical teams. In effect, the nurses were doing the work that was assigned 
to the EPR and AKI coordinators in Hospital X. Although frontline staff in Hospital Y still 
received alerts directly on electronic reporting systems, the specialist nurses regularly 
attended to each ward in person in order to provide guidance and prompt appropriate 
actions. When the nurses ‘handed over’ to each ward, there was then a limited extent to 
which they could then continue to monitor and intervene (being only two of them to cover the 
entire hospital). The nurses encountered several difficulties at this point in terms of: 1. low 
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awareness of and engagement with AKI, which could become resistance to their 
intervention; and 2. a need to establish and monitor a reliable process for ensuring that once 
they removed themselves from the wards, the teams would carry out the correct process. 
This shaped the design and implementation of their care process checklist, which is 
described below. 
 
4.4 Care Processes and Bundles 
There are several recommended care bundles for AKI, drawing on a combination of NICE; 
KDIGO and Think Kidneys guidance (see Section 3.1). 
 
Although NICE and Think Kidneys provide detailed guidance, breaking the steps required 
down into particular actions, as general guidance, the steps themselves are not always 
associated with particular groups or professionals, and they do not constitute a ‘work plan’ 
that is specific and action oriented. There are examples of more detailed action guides, for 
example, the AQ bundle (Section 3.1.2) sets out a structured work plan through a series of 
decision support prompts. While it is more specific and action-oriented, there is still 
translational work required in order to embed these stages within local systems and routines.  
 
4.4.1 Care Bundle: Hospital X  
The function of the collaborative was to work out ways to make sure the alert system was 
working effectively in all involved clinical areas and to develop methods through which the 
different elements of the care bundle could become embedded into clinical areas and 
routines. The active period of the collaborative resulted in a change package which tied the 
alert and bundle together. Together, the change package and the role of the collaborative 
represented the organisational translation of the bundle into local routines and systems. A 
key example of this was the identification and development of the role of the ‘safety huddle’ 
in identifying and communicating actions, which became a discrete step in the change 
package (See Figure 2 Section 3.2.1). In other cases, the tests resulted in ideas being 
rejected. For example, the bundle required the fluid intake and output (or “fluid balance”) of 
each patient thought to be at risk of AKI to be monitored. This is an important and on the 
surface, a relatively simple task. One ward involved in the collaborative tested the idea of 
having patients record their own fluid balance but found that in practice, this was not feasible 
as the patients were often too ill and found the task too onerous.  
In addition to the active role the collaborative played in creating and testing the series of 
actions that became the change package, it also played a symbolic part in attempting to 
communicate these changes to those who did not participate in the programme. This 
entailed situating the change package within short case studies, describing the genesis and 
rationale for the change in the words of participants, so as to perform some of the 
translational work which change requires. These descriptions also reproduce key 
assumptions associated with the programme, such as resource neutrality, through slogans 
such as ‘work smarter, not harder’.  
This process of allocating tasks related to the bundle caused certain tensions to emerge. 
Some of the nurses involved in the collaborative felt too much of the care bundle was being 
allocated to the nursing staff. The tensions in the programme reflected the distinction 
between ‘work as imagined’ and ‘work as done’.26 50 As already noted, the care bundle was 
not supposed to create new work for clinical staff. Instead, it was imagined that the care 
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bundle merely standardised the work nurses were “supposed to be doing anyway”. In the 
rationale of the programme, it would not add a new process, but merely simplify an existing 
process. What the programme did not contend with however, was the existence of multiple, 
simultaneous quality improvement programmes, and other increasingly competing demands 
on ward staff. At the same time as the AKI collaborative was underway, a programme of 
activity aimed at improving the management of sepsis was also introduced. Moreover, during 
this period, the hospital was facing pressures due to falling budgets and increasing demand. 
If standardising one strand of work was not too onerous, standardising multiple strands had 
a kind of cumulative effect. Different programmes competed for time and attention from 
clinical staff. These pressures meant the QI managers began to face challenges such as 
attendance at collaborative days.  
4.4.2 Care Process Checklist: Hospital Y 
The Hospital Y approach was to implement a checklist to be used by clinical teams on each 
ward. Hospital Y had deliberately gone against a ‘bundled’ approach to measuring and 
monitoring of QI progress and compliance. This meant that each step in the care process 
was measured independently rather than aggregated into one ‘all or nothing’ package. In 
practice, the checklist was very similar in content and delivery to the care bundle 
implemented in Hospital X. The differences between the organisational process for 
implementing and embedding the bundle differ, in part due to the differences described in 
relation to the alert phase of the e-alert, and in part due to the different general approach 
adopted to each programme.  
 
One of the consequences of the initial decision not to adopt a ‘bundle’ approach, was that 
the checklist did not exist prior to the initiation of the QI programme. Its content and use 
developed through the programme as one of the responses to the challenges encountered 
by the specialist nurses in engaging ward staff and raising their awareness and knowledge 
of AKI. This relates to the discussion above, about the different points at which AKI care was 
‘handed over’ and the different personnel involved in this hand over. The hand over that 
occurred in Hospital Y was from one discrete team (specialist) to another (ward-based). Both 
teams had different skills, and they might have been quite unfamiliar with each other prior to 
the programme being initiated. This meant that the nurse specialists and their education and 
instructions for the appropriate treatment of AKI were sometimes perceived as an imposition.  
This contrasts with the approach of Hospital X to involve clinical teams and locate the steps 
for improvement within their everyday work.  
 
The handover of information therefore had to negotiate boundaries to do with 
specialist/generalist orientations, nurse/doctor, different teams and a lack of familiarity 
between the specialist nurses and the teams they were handing over to. The checklist 
therefore became a ‘boundary object’; 54 a material means of supporting the more ‘bounded’ 
hand-over from nurse specialists to wards.  
 
Another major component of the QI work, the education component, was also shaped by 
these boundaries. The education began as a session to which clinical teams were invited, 
but when it proved too difficult to engage teams away from wards, this became a mobile 
presentation, which the specialist nurses took around to wards and often delivered one-to-
one. The checklist emerged out of this same iterative process of engagement/resistance and 
modification. 
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Through the development of the checklist and delivery of education, the AKI nurses built 
relationships and enlisted greater engagement and participation from local teams. Over time 
this appeared to overcome any initial feelings of imposition. 
 
The different use of technology in each site is also evident in the checklist, which is a paper 
and pen document, with different sections to be filled out by doctors and nurses. We return 
to this in discussion. 
 
4.5 CQUIN for AKI 
The NHS England CQUIN for 2015-16 required hospitals to ensure that information related 
to the stage of AKI, medication review and type and frequency of blood tests was 
communicated to patients and documented at the point of discharge.45 Of the two trusts, 
Hospital X was the only site to adopt the CQUIN. This is because Hospital Y had already 
agreed a separate list of AKI performance metrics with the commissioners prior to the launch 
of this CQUIN. As such, there is no direct comparison to be made between the two in the 
way in which this was implemented.  
The CQUIN was adopted in Hospital X in April 2015, for 12 months. This meant it 
overlapped substantially with the collaborative programme, the first learning session for 
which was held in September 2015. The CQUIN targets were monitored as part of the AKI 
working group meetings, and there was an attempt made to separate out the agenda of 
these meetings, to distinguish between the CQUIN and the QI collaborative. This separation 
signalled awareness on the part of the organisation that the two programmes represented 
two different and to some extent competing ways of trying to introduce change. In contrast to 
what we have described as the ideals of the QI programme as ‘bottom up’ and ‘distributed’, 
the CQUIN works in a very ‘top down’ and individually accountable manner. Once the 
CQUIN target has been set then this becomes the essential requirement of the work – there 
is no external benefit attached to going beyond the target, nor for any ‘process’ learning that 
might occur in relation to achieving the target. In the QI programme, although targets are set 
at the start and the programme works towards the achievement of these targets, there is a 
significant emphasis placed upon the process according to which implementation happens, 
and the importance of being able to provide a rationale for the changes to be made. The only 
rationale for change that the CQUIN offers is the simple one of either reaching the target and 
getting paid, or not. The differences between the two programmes were referred to by 
individuals in Hospital X as ‘carrot & stick’, referring to the collaborative and CQUIN 
approaches respectively. By offering participants the opportunity to be involved with change 
and to shape the methods and means by which change is introduced, the QI programme 
aims for what we might call ‘rational commitment’ from those involved. By establishing a 
binary target according to which the organisation either receives a particular benefit or not, 
and by not including any focus upon the process by which this target is achieved, the 
CQUIN, in contrast, only inspires a sense of ‘ritual conformity’.55 This matters, firstly, for 
thinking about the translation of ‘work as imagined’ into ‘work as done’, and secondly for 
thinking about creating sustainable change – both of which we return to in discussion. 
Before the collaborative was formally launched, several meetings were held within acute 
admissions. These meetings were intended to test some of the programme methodology 
before rolling out the programme across the 11 collaborative wards. In one of these 
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meetings, members of the working group attempted to map how the ward staff were 
responding to the AKI alert. Members of the collaborative first had to work through and 
‘process map’ patient flow, in order to be able to describe the chain of events and actions 
that should be triggered upon the system communicating an alert. This required complex 
and coordinated care processes to be broken down into individual stages, each with defined 
actions, accountable persons, and reliable processes for reducing variance and incidents. As 
described in relation to the tying of the alert to the bundle, this mapping process required a 
detailed moment-by-moment breakdown of process into practical steps which could be 
reliably implemented. For example, in emergency admissions, there was a focus on the point 
at which the pathologist would telephone the ward to notify clinical staff that a patient likely 
was having an AKI 3. This was a particular problem in emergency admissions as the busy 
and unpredictable nature of the ward meant it was difficult to predict who would likely receive 
the call. The QI lead conducting the mapping therefore tried to implement a system for 
recording the phone call so as to ensure reliability of the broader system.  
Experiences such as the process mapping taking place during these emergency ward 
meetings showed how practices of performance management and collaborative working 
could become more closely intertwined than their formal separation implies. It was notable 
the effect that the CQUIN criteria had upon the rationale according to which the process 
mapping proceeded; which began as an open-ended attempt to map a range of possible 
pathways for AKI patients, into and through the emergency assessment unit. When it 
appeared that this process was becoming too lengthy and complex, the CQUIN criteria were 
introduced in order to establish a required set of outcomes that needed to be assured 
through the definition of a single, standard process. In this respect, the CQUIN reduced the 
degree of ‘exploration’ of new approaches that it was possible for the process mapping to 
achieve, and instead emphasised the ‘exploitation’ of existing approaches/resources for a 
specific aim. This is not to say that it was necessarily a positive or negative thing – the 
balance to be struck between exploration/exploitation is an essential part of decision-making 
in any programme of innovation.10 Although the CQUIN narrowed the exploration of possible 
processes, we also note that the existence of the CQUIN forced discharge onto the agenda 
of the organisation, which might not have occurred through the QI programme alone. 
Within both hospitals the involvement of pharmacy within the QI programmes was seen as 
essential. This relates to the guidance to have a pharmacy review within 24 hours for anyone 
with a suspected AKI. In Hospital X, the CQUIN target, which included confirmation that the 
pharmacy review had been completed, drew attention to the role of the discharge summary 
in continuing care. Through the process mapping, this in turn had an impact on the manner 
in which the care process was organised from the point at which the AKI alert was raised.  
However, beyond the achievement of the CQUIN target, there was still a sense among some 
members of the working group that there remained ‘two types’ of discharge; one in which a 
continuing care process in primary and community care had been given due attention, and 
one in which this had not happened. This suggests that although the CQUIN prompts 
attention to a particular process, meeting the targets might be a question of demonstrating 
correct procedure. If the box to confirm that a pharmacy review has occurred was ticked, 
then this demonstrates adherence to the correct procedure. Such an approach allows 
improvement to be quantified, demonstrated and audited, however, it cannot provide quality 
assurance about the information that is handed from pharmacy to the nursing staff that 
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undertake discharge, or then from the nurse to the patient and GP as part of the discharge 
process. This issue is further explored in the following section.     
As the collaborative programme lacked financial incentives, the CQUIN became an 
important artefact in the working group’s efforts to promote the importance of AKI and, by 
extension, the collaborative. However, this had both positive and negative consequences. 
Towards the end of the programme, after the CQUIN was achieved there was a distinct drop 
in attendance of collaborative meetings. This was likely due to a variety of factors, many of 
which were not within the control of the managers. However, some managers speculated 
that achieving the CQUIN, despite its limited scope, had nevertheless given rise to the sense 
that AKI was now done, there was nothing left to be achieved, and therefore no reason to 
continue to attend the collaborative meetings.  
4.6 Patient Perspectives 
Within Hospital X’s collaborative, as already described (Section 4.1.1), patient narratives 
functioned as a way of enrolling clinical staff into the programme and situating ‘basic’ care 
processes and practices within ‘real’ experiences. The patient narratives that appeared at 
the start of the collaborative days were consciously intended to augment the more process 
and outcome focused presentations with something emotive and to make a relationship 
between the practical tasks the audience was being asked to do and their effects in the lives 
of people. As the programme progressed however and time during the collaborative days 
became more pressured, the patient narratives were dropped from presentations. 
There is a gap in academic literature with regard to patient experience of AKI. The study 
intended to help fill this gap by exploring the experiences, journeys, and experiences of 
patients diagnosed with AKI. The focus of the interviews was broad, covering the full range 
of AKI patients (AKI Stage One, Two and Three) and aimed at capturing the plurality and 
diversity of AKI patient experiences.  
We only approached patients for interview if they had been formally told be a clinician about 
their AKI. However, only two of eight patients with whom we spoke could define AKI and 
understood its role in their treatment and illness. The other patients either claimed to have 
never heard of AKI before or believed the first time they had come across the term AKI was 
in the study invitation. One patient, a twenty year old man who had received a diagnosis of 
AKI 2 during a recent hospital stay – reacted with confusion when asked about his 
understanding of AKI. His complex and protracted experience could be traced back to 
Christmas 2013 when he developed pneumonia. The infection caused septicaemia and 
respiratory failure and ultimately led to a stay in ICU. Perhaps because of the complexity of 
his treatment and illness, this patient did not remember the diagnosis of AKI. The interviewer 
had to remind the patient that the research project of which he was now a part was 
principally concerned with AKI. After a certain amount of cajoling, the patient did remember 
AKI and told the researcher that the first time he had encountered the term “acute kidney 
injury” was on the postal invitation our team had sent him as part of the effort to find potential 
interviewees.  
A likely explanation for the patients not recalling their diagnoses is that AKI often happens in 
the context of episodes of severe and acute illness and in certain circumstances, particular 
when the AKI is minor – i.e. stage 1 – it does not cause subjectively appreciable symptoms. 
For the patient mentioned above, AKI was a hazily remembered detail embedded in a story 
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of life interrupted by a period of severe illness, rather than a self-contained illness 
experience in its own regard. This and other narratives illustrated how AKI features as an 
element in often protracted and complex narratives of treatment and care. In doing so, 
instances of communication about AKI, medicine management, and so on can be lost in an 
excess of information as patients deal with episodes of acute illness.  
The lack of an easily recognisable empirical basis for AKI has particular implications for 
Hospital X. As a methodology, QI relies on a shared sense of what is important in order to 
engage participation. This is true of Hospital Y in terms of senior buy-in and especially true 
of Hospital X because of the lack of traditional incentives. However, unlike previous 
collaboratives (sepsis) – or areas where QI has been successful (such as cancer) there is no 
coherent patient body or unifying identity upon which a shared understanding could be built. 
The distributed nature of AKI means the effects of AKI are not always obvious to clinicians 
operating in discrete areas. Neither can the effects of AKI be easily located in an emotional 
context; patient’s lack of awareness of the contribution of AKI to their illness episode means 
they are unlikely to associate AKI with suffering or attach discrete experiences to it. In other 
words, it is difficult to make an emotionally compelling case for AKI QI because there is not a 
normative story attached to it. 
This means there needs to be more work to illustrate the effects AKI has – via its capacity to 
complicate the care of other conditions or to lead to kidney failure – in the contexts of 
people’s lives and experiences of illness, care, and treatment. However, as patients do not 
necessarily experience AKI as the cause of their suffering/ illness, clinicians must show how 
the effects of AKI take form in real life case study examples. Illustrating the effects of AKI on 
patients therefore has to be accomplished between clinicians and patients, rather than by 
either party in isolation. Nurse specialist led approaches to quality improvement have an 
advantage here due to nurses’ the direct, face-to-face interactions with patients. 
Collaborative based approaches may need to develop alternative means to engage more 
fully with patient populations. 
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5. Discussion  
In the following section we introduce a summary of the key findings presented in terms of 
key tensions and trade-offs which we have highlighted. We then discuss findings in light of 
existing literature and draw out implications for research, policy and practice. 
5.1 Summary of Key Findings 
We introduced this report by noting the key overarching tension created by an context of 
resource pressures, combined with the IHI Triple Aim: improvement to ‘care, health and 
cost’.13 Our findings demonstrate the effects of these resource pressures upon the adoption 
and implementation of QI programmes in each site, exacerbating the translation of ‘work as 
imagined’ into ‘work as done’.26 50 This overarching tension feeds into several more:  
Tension 1: Maximising utility and effectiveness of new approaches whilst minimising 
additional burden 
Although central to any attempt to introduce new approaches, the achievement in practice of 
a balance between the benefit and burden associated with the introduction of a new 
approach takes considerable work. This work is often unrecognised in the sense that new 
approaches are not always easily adapted to different organisational contexts, and also in 
the sense that the work of adaptation is often not supported by dedicated resourcing at the 
system level. 
Several features specific to AKI further shape the experience of this tension. AKI is still a 
relatively new way of classifying the deterioration of kidney function associated with acute 
episodes of illness (for example, AKI Stage Three replaces the more established description 
of ‘acute renal failure’). From this derives a general lack of knowledge among health care 
staff of best practice in relation to identification and management. The adoption of new 
processes in England has been stimulated by the publication of NICE guidance (2014), 
mandatory introduction of e-alerts (2015), and incentivised targets (2015). Although these 
policies and guidelines have pushed AKI onto the improvement agendas of organisations, 
their implementation on the ground is still in its infancy and there is a distinct lack of 
knowledge relating to the necessary adaptive processes required at the organisational level 
to accommodate these changes. Therefore, there is no generalisable guidance concerning 
how to optimise this process according to the aim of maximising utility and effectiveness 
whilst minimise additional burden.  
We have observed two different approaches to navigate this challenge: Hospital X was at a 
slightly earlier point in the development of their AKI QI Programme and was more 
‘exploratory’ in character.10 Their work was focused upon local teams developing and 
embedding a reliable system of alert and bundle that could be incorporated into local 
practice; the assumption being that over time this would represent a ‘resource neutral’ 
intervention.  This work was key in making visible issues associated with changes to do with 
quality/safety and bureaucratic burden. Practical learning in the form of tests of change 
allowed moment-to-moment actions and communications to be considered and re-shaped to 
accommodate changes.  
The approach taken by Hospital Y was more developed at the time of evaluation as Figure 1 
shows, and was more ‘exploitative’ in approach.10 Piloting the implementation of a locally 
developed AKI e-alert system, through the role of a specialist nurse, demonstrated positive 
results and potential cost savings produced by shorter lengths of stay. Through monitoring 
and correction of over-identification, the role of the specialist nurse enabled use of a more 
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sensitive alert (see Tension 2, below). Secondly, the nurse specialists spent considerable 
time to attend to the handover of care to local teams, and to develop the checklist and use it 
in collaboration with them. 
A specific example of the tension between benefit and burden discussed above is found in 
the introduction of the AKI alert. A key difference in approach between our two sites is the 
use of technology to support both the detection and alerting phases of the system. Hospital 
Y put greater work into the detection phase in order to eradicate under-identification. 
Specialist nurses then had to develop a combination of IT and paper-based systems in order 
to regulate hand over to ward teams. Hospital X adopted the national algorithm and with it 
the possibility of both under- and over- identification. However, their fully integrated 
electronic care record allowed them to embed the alert phase into day-to-day routines of 
wards at system and practice level.  
There is a trade-off to be faced by organisations which is inherent to the introduction of the 
AKI alert. The national alert results in both under- and over-identification, creating the 
potential for both under- and over-diagnosis. This means that rather than substituting human 
resources such as time and clinical judgement, it requires these to be made into a reliable 
system for the detection of AKI. Hospital X worked to manage this trade off by embedding 
the alert into a collective care process based upon regular handovers between local teams, 
and automated prompting to guide decision making. Hospital Y worked to manage this trade 
off by first eradicating all under-diagnosis and then deploying AKI nurse specialists in order 
to eradicate over-diagnosis and to support the embedding of appropriate actions at local 
team level.  
Both these solutions come with a resource dependency. In Hospital Y, this is associated with 
the cost of providing sufficient AKI nurse specialist time to check for over-diagnosis and to 
embed in local teams. Over time, one might expect the embedding work to reduce, as local 
teams become more proficient in the management of AKI (and this had already begun to be 
observed during data collection). In Hospital X, because the programme was a collaborative, 
the resource is distributed among a greater number of people. Nevertheless, there are 
particular roles – such as the AKI coordinator, which is allocated each day to enable a 
distributed responsibility – upon whom the system is reliant. Additionally, the system worked 
by being embedded in the ‘safety huddles’, which contained a checklist of all the different 
safety priorities which needed to be discussed at handover. This is in itself a finite resource, 
as there is finite time available in which to conduct a huddle and a finite number of items that 
can be included on a checklist.  
Tension 2:  QI as a mechanism to address the IHI Triple Aim of improving care, health and 
cost 
QI programmes which undertake the work described above are a possible means of 
realising the ambition of the IHI ‘Triple Aim’ of care, health and cost.13 However, further 
attention is needed to the effects of resource pressures upon these aims, where one might 
expect resource pressures to drive a cost driven approach. In Hospital Y, senior 
management required some demonstration of impact prior to committing ongoing resources 
to the project and this drove them towards a more formally structured approach centred 
upon creating and defining the roles of the AKI Specialist Nurses.  
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In Hospital X, we observed the effects of resource pressures upon the ability to engage staff 
and sustain that engagement over a period of time. This had a knock-on effect in reducing 
the input of participating staff in the spread of the changes to non-participating wards.   
 
Both sites reported successes against core outcome measures, which reflected a 
combination of improvements to each element of the Triple Aim: 
Table 5: Performance of QI programmes against the IHI Triple Aim 
 Hospital X Hospital Y 
Care  Improved identification of AKI 
through embedding 
detection/alert system 
 Embedding care process 
bundle with electronic prompts 
to support local teams 
 Delivery of hospital-wide online 
AKI training programme 
 Improved identification of AKI 
through embedding detection/alert 
system 
 Modified detection system 
eradicating all under-diagnosis 
 Embedding care process checklist 
to support local teams 
 Education and awareness training 
delivered by AKI nurse specialists 
Health  Reduction in numbers of 
hospital acquired AKIs 
 Reduction in progression from 
AKI Stage One to Stage Two 
and Three 
 Reduction in overall incidence of 
AKI 
 Reduction in hospital acquired AKI 
 Reduction in length of stay for AKI 
 Reduction in AKI days 
 Reduction in mortality related to AKI 
Cost  No estimated cost savings yet 
associated with programme. 
 Successful attainment of 
CQUIN with value in excess of 
£500k 
 Estimated costs savings associated 
with reduced length of stay in 
excess of £1m per year 
 
Both hospitals reported results that indicate success of both the QI programmes under 
examination here. However, our findings also highlight the potential for tensions and trade-
offs to achieve these aims. An overarching trade-off is in the degree of investment an 
organisation can make in the interests of achieving improvements. If the improvement is 
‘only’ to health and care, then can the expense of producing the change be justified? The 
example of Hospital X suggests that this may be possible though one must consider the QI 
resources and expertise already embedded in this organisation to begin with.  Hospital Y 
demonstrates a more ‘exploitative’ approach – requiring evidence of effect and potential cost 
savings prior to committing substantial resources to improvement.  
 
These two approaches exemplified a distinction between ‘exploratory’ and ‘exploitative’ 
innovation.10 Exploitative innovation entails ‘exploiting’ existing products or ways of working 
to enable incremental improvement, while exploratory approaches entail learning anew in 
order to open up potentially radical innovation. Exploitative approaches have the advantage 
of building upon what is known or has been successfully demonstrated. Exploratory 
approaches have the advantage of opening up a specific activity for detailed examination, in 
so doing aim to illuminate key ‘blockages’, which once resolved can have transformative 
effects beyond the immediate domain of interest. At the same time the exploratory approach 
requires the organisation to accept a greater risk associated with uncertainty of outcome.10-12 
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This raises a question of the extent to which systems exist in organisations for making such 
decisions. This would require a formal process for identifying, prioritising and planning areas 
for improvement, which was informed by regional and national strategic planning, but also 
sensitive to the expertise and capabilities within the organisation and the needs of relevant 
local patient populations.  
 
The potential for conflicts between more specific aims can also be seen. For example, the 
aim to reduce length of stay introduces a resource pressure upon discharge, which must 
occur earlier, and must be accompanied by information sufficient to guide both patient and 
professional decision making once out of hospital. 
   
We suggest, firstly, that greater attention is needed to the question of how prioritisation 
occurs within different organisations and secondly, how design decisions are made within 
particular programmes with respect to each element of the Triple Aim; if there is conflict 
between the aims, the question of which aim should be prioritised will likely depend on 
internal and external resource considerations. Further, this highlights the broader system in 
which organisations are situated; AKI is experienced across the interface between 
secondary and primary care, creating the need for knowledge of its identification and 
management to also be transferred. This is complicated by the very different ways in which 
secondary and primary care operate with regards processes of quality improvement, as well 
as basic differences in organisational structures and policy priorities. This underscores the 
importance of local structures which seek to integrate the priorities and resources of primary 
and secondary care in QI work. There is evidence that existing mechanisms for improving 
safety and quality do not realise their full potential with a need to aggregate data and 
encourage learning across orgnaisations.56-58 As a digital leader, Hospital X’s integrated 
EPR has the potential to support QI across the interfaces of care.  The establishment of AKI 
nurse specialist may offer the potential to support more coordinated and effective discharge 
for a high risk patient population, known to have a high rate of readmission.59 60 61 
Tension 3: Learning and Improvement v Performance management  
In Hospital X, the QI expertise and infrastructure already embedded in the organisation 
enabled them to pursue a more exploratory and collaborative approach. Nevertheless, the 
introduction of the CQUIN, which overlapped with the collaborative programme, brought to 
light some tensions between conflicting approaches – the collaborative, which was focussed 
on changes that were driven by and situated within the everyday work of ward teams, and 
the CQUIN which required a set target to be reached but could not assure a ‘quality’ process 
had been followed in achieving this.  
There was evidence that the time-limited and target-driven approach of the CQUIN drove 
intense activity in order to attain the target but did little to sustain this activity beyond its 
lifespan. Furthermore, in spite of the attempts of the QI team and working group to present 
these two approaches (CQUIN and collaborative) as separate endeavours, it appears this 
was not necessarily understood uniformly by staff, resulting in disengagement from the wider 
QI programme once the CQUIN had been achieved. 
In this respect, when pursued in isolation, CQUINs and other incentivised approaches 
appear to represent the kind of sporadic and disconnected attention to modifying particular 
work practices which might be undone or re-modified with the next incentive and are unlikely 
to accumulate over time into organisational learning and systems development. 
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In Hospital Y, demonstration of savings prior to dedicating funds to support ongoing quality 
improvement was required. This hurdle was overcome through the deployment of existing 
resources to demonstrate the potential of the work. From this point on, a more exploratory 
approach was made possible, in tailoring the role of the AKI nurse specialists and the 
handover from specialist to local teams. Nevertheless, had the initial pilot not been as 
successful (which might have happened for various reasons to do with the difficulty of 
demonstrating measurable impacts in a short space of time), then it is possible the 
mandatory introduction of the alert would have proceeded without the expanded AKI nurse 
specialist role, and a less safe, less reliable system would have been the result.  
Tension 4: Resourcing patient involvement and perspective as part of QI activity. 
We briefly note here the effects upon patient involvement of the overarching resource 
tension, and the attempt to maximise utility while minimising burden. An important part of this 
is minimising treatment burden, and the targets in both sites related to the prevention of 
progression from Stage One to Stage Two or Three (Hospital X), and the attempt to reduce 
‘AKI days’ (Hospital Y) clearly show that both sites were cognisant of this issue. 
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that there was a limited extent to which patient needs 
and voices could be enacted through either programme. This implies a need for support to 
be provided to organisations to involve patients as part of QI endeavours; nevertheless our 
findings also note some of the complexities specific to AKI which will make this challenging. 
5.2 Relating tensions to existing research 
 
5.2.1 Work as Imagined and Work as Done 
The tensions and trade-offs related to the attempt to maximise the benefits of new 
approaches while minimising their additional burden can be related to the concepts of Work 
as Imagined (WAI) and Work as Done (WAD), which have been developed in the healthcare 
safety and resilience literature. This research defines safety as the ability ‘to make dynamic 
trade-offs and to adjust performance in order to meet changing demands and to deal with 
disturbances and surprises’.50 Safety failures are therefore to be understood not in terms of 
individual mistakes, accidents or errors but rather as ‘dysfunctional interactions’ that become 
embedded in complex systems over time.62  
WAD makes visible this dynamic relationship and the resulting translational work that is 
required in order to match the ideals of new approaches, with organisational processes and 
practices through which those ideals can be realised.63 Previous studies have highlighted the 
problems encountered when this everyday work is not acknowledged at a ‘system’ level – 
i.e. at the level of making policy and developing guidelines and approaches.47 The outcome 
of a lack of attention at a system level is that policies and guidelines are not realistic, and 
organisations are under-resourced in their attempts to turn ideals into practice.47 50 The 
introduction of something new into a complex system initiates a process of adaptations and 
trade-offs referred to as ‘workarounds’.50 64   
Our findings resonate strongly with these conceptual concerns, highlighting in particular the 
ongoing and conflicted relationship between external context (policy and resources), 
organisational context (e.g. organisational attitude to improvement) and the ongoing 
decisions regarding adoption, implementation and modification of QI approaches.  Drawing 
on our findings relating to e-alerts: a mandate required organisations to introduce this new 
system by a particular time, irrespective of resource capacities. Trade-offs followed in 
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organisational decision making: Hospital X chose to accept the deficiencies of the ‘detection’ 
phase of the alert and put translational work into the ‘alert’ side. Hospital Y chose to correct 
some of the deficiencies of the detection side, but this created the need for the workarounds 
of the specialist nurses to monitor, correct and handover the alert. 
Our findings from two hospitals demonstrate the work required in order translate AKI policy 
into practice. Aspects of this work have the potential to be unacknowledged and under 
resourced at the system level. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the care processes 
approach taken by in depth guidelines such as those produced by Think Kidneys, perhaps 
allow for a smoother transition from work as imagined and work as done, when compared to 
the CQUIN, for example, the ideal of which is to ‘transform pathways’ and yet it contains no 
mechanism, guidance or support to enable this transformation to be made in practice.32 43 45 
Previous research relating to the effectiveness of incentivised approaches to quality 
improvement noted issues related to sustainability, particularly when such approaches are 
adopted in isolation.65 66 Our findings develop this further, showing that even when such 
approaches are not adopted in isolation, but in tandem with an ongoing QI programme within 
a receptive culture and high degree of support at various levels, that there are still issues of 
‘drop off’ following the achievement of incentives, and limits to the effectiveness of 
incentivised approaches in locating meaningful improvements at the level of everyday work. 
The research evidence related to adaptation and workarounds in complex systems prompts 
further reflection upon the extent to which changes introduced in these two programmes 
might be expected to be sustained (a question we give more detailed attention to below).50 63 
64 In particular, in both sites, concerns were raised about the shifting of resources and 
priorities towards new areas of improvement prior to the completion of their programmes of 
work. If new programmes of work result in the adoption of new practices which conflict with 
the practices adopted as part of this programme of work then further trade-offs will be 
necessary, and the sustainability of any change is put in question. As we have discussed 
with the literature on ‘alert fatigue’, so recursive adaptation and workaround also brings with 
it the possibility of improvement fatigue. This problem has not been described elsewhere, 
and although it is a logical consequence of the dysfunctional effects of accumulated 
adaptation and workaround, further attention is required to the implications of this that our 
findings have raised, for the engagement and commitment of individuals engaged in 
improvement, and for the possibility of conflict and trade-offs between past, present and 
future versions of everyday work (i.e. WAD).  
5.2.2 New technology, alert fatigue and care bundles 
We have discussed the tension concerning the balance of benefit and burden specifically in 
relation to the introduction of the AKI alert. Previous research alerts us to a general problem 
concerning the introduction of technology driven approaches, in proceeding according to the 
assumption that technology will necessarily result in more efficient, less human-dependent 
systems and processes. In practice this assumption has been challenged by research which 
notes the existence of enduring barriers to the effective introduction and embedding of new 
technology.27 67 In general, barriers to effective implementation are thought to be mitigated 
by iterative design models which pay attention to the broad range of material, human and 
environmental factors that are relevant to the introduction of the technology in question.68-70 
Examples of specific barriers relevant to our findings are presented in Table 6 below: 
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Table 6: Barriers to the introduction of new technology 
Barrier Description Example from Findings 
Technology Characteristics of the technology 
itself that impede implementation70 
71 
Alert tendency to both over- and 
under-identification of possible 
cases of AKI 
Logistic Features of the core tasks 
associated with the use of the 
technology that impede effective 
implementation70 72 
Alert reliance on existing blood 
results to provide a baseline for 
identification of possible AKI 
Human-
Technology 
Interaction 
Recursive impacts on 
implementation related to 
disruption to workflow caused by 
the introduction of technology and 
the acceptance and use of that 
technology in practice68 69 73 74 
Challenge of developing a reliable 
system for embedding the ‘alert’ 
phase within routine care processes 
Organisation Wide range of issues related to the 
ability of organisations to adapt to 
and embed new technology into 
enduring structures and 
processes68 72 75 
Extent to which alert could be 
embedded within integrated 
electronic systems and decision 
prompts 
System Features of the wider environment, 
such as policy, governance and 
finance, which can impact ability of 
organisations to introduce and 
embed new approaches71 72 75 76 
Availability of dedicated funds to 
support introduction of technology 
  
In relating these general findings to the specific case of AKI, we note studies have 
highlighted the lack of effectiveness of introducing AKI alerts in isolation with the potential for 
alert fatigue.52 53 In a recent UK study, Kangasundaram et al (2017) highlighted that a 
mandated response to an AKI alerting system can irritate users with the potential to disrupt 
existing workflow.52 Their evaluation indicated that clinicians found ways to bypass alerts, 
which in doing so had a knock-on effect and ‘simply hid it until the next time a patient’s chart 
was accessed.’ In addition, alert credibility could be ‘strained’ when the detection was 
deemed to be too sensitive.52 
As stated, a key finding that emerged through our ethnographic approach was the 
considerable efforts carried out by staff in both hospitals to maximise the effectiveness of the 
AKI alert whilst minimising the potential for unnecessary workload burden and over-
diagnosis. In a context where workload pressures are near saturation point, clinicians and QI 
teams worked to navigate this inherent challenge underpinning care. Hospital X’s approach 
offered the potential to shape implementation through end user engagement, whereas 
Hospital Y sought to reduce potential for over-diagnosis and credibility issues through the 
role of the AKI Nurse Specialist and their allocated responsibility to review all AKI alerts.  
Kangasundaram et al recommended the need for an ‘end-user responsive process’ that 
extends beyond initial scoping and implementation. The drop off in participation at 
Collaborative meetings due to workload pressures in Hospital X may jeopardise this. The 
effectiveness of Hospital Y’s approach may be dependent on on-going resourcing of AKI 
Nurses Specialists. Our analysis of the discharge process and patient perspective, offers an 
insight into further possibilities to optimise the delivery within the two trusts and across the 
interfaces of care.  
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5.2.3 The Triple Aim and incentives to change 
The Triple Aim is described as ‘strategic organising principles for health care organisations 
and geographic communities that seek, simultaneously, to improve the individual experience 
of care and the health of populations and to reduce the per capita costs of care for 
populations’.14 Drawing on a retrospective review of programmes that had signed up to the 
triple aims programme, research proposes three guiding principles for achievements against 
all three aims, each broken down into component elements (see Table 7, below).14  
Table 7: Guiding principles for achieving the IHI Triple Aim 
Guiding Principle Component Elements 
Capturing the right foundation for 
population management 
Identifying a relevant population 
Identifying/Creating leadership and governance 
structures 
Articulating a purpose around which stakeholders 
will coalesce 
Managing services at scale for a 
population 
Identifying a population segment on which to 
focus 
Conducting a needs and assets assessment 
Developing a portfolio of projects 
Designing or redesigning services 
Developing a plan for delivering services at scale 
Expanding the capabilities of ‘integrator’ 
organisations 
Developing a learning system for 
population management 
Using population-level measures 
Developing an explicit theory or rationale for 
system changes 
Learning by iterative testing 
Using informative cases to ‘act with the individual; 
learn for the population’ 
Selecting leaders to manage and oversee the 
learning system 
 
Several of the components listed in Table 7, above, can be readily applied to aspects of the 
two programmes we have studied, for example we can identify challenges and opportunities 
relevant to the identifying a relevant population with regards AKI, which is distributed, multi-
morbid and transient, but at the same time is a ‘force multiplier’, for which ‘getting the basics 
right’ might prompt significant change. Equally, we have noted in some detail the differences 
between the two sites in the manner in which they set out governance and leadership, 
articulated their purpose, developed projects, and learned by iterative testing. Given that 
many of the components listed in Table 7 are re-statements of the core aims and 
components of IHI improvement methodologies (see Section 2.1) it is perhaps unsurprising 
that we can map the experience of both sites onto them. 
However, there remain challenges, noted in Tensions Two and Three (see above), that 
remain unresolved by a focus upon these environmental, organisational and cultural 
concerns, and neglecting issues associated with the specific materials through which 
improvements to AKI are being mobilised, the possibilities for action they afford, the work it 
takes to adapt everyday practice to new approaches, and the resources available to 
undertake this work – bringing together these concerns we highlight the following three 
challenges to achieving the Triple Aim: 
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1. the necessary but complex task of introducing systematic but adaptable systems 
to prioritise and initiate particular programmes of improvement 
2. the relationship between improvement adoption decisions and the likely 
achievement of the Triple Aim 
3. the potential for tensions and trade-offs between the three elements of the Triple 
Aim, and in particular the influence of ‘Cost’ in a resource scarce-environment 
While the first of these challenges can be thought about in relation to the components set out 
in Table 7, above, the second and third challenges require attention to the specific 
affordances of the material means of making improvements (see Section 5.2.2) and the 
recursive relationship of this to the local context in question and the QI approach adopted. In 
general, it appears that attempting to consider each element of the Triple Aim 
simultaneously results in possibly ‘uncomfortable’ trade-offs.77 More specifically, we have 
noted the affordances of new approaches to identifying AKI, such as the e-alert, which 
affords a measure of standardisation in the identification of AKI, but directs attention to 
specific issues, such as over- and under-diagnosis, the management of which involves 
trade-offs and results in ‘drift’ from the ideal of standardisation.29 This suggests that research 
into the Triple Aim requires greater attention to the unfolding and political relationship 
between material and organisational aspects of context relevant to QI programmes.29 78  We 
now consider this relationship in more detail, with a focus upon the key question for QI of 
sustainability of changes. 
5.2.4 Organisational change, learning, and sustainability 
Thinking more broadly across the tensions related to resource constraint, adaptive work, and 
the ideal to embed change within a longer-term narrative of organisational learning, we draw 
upon research related to sustainability.  
As already noted, there is a substantial amount of organisational research focussing on how 
change happens. Often this is organised around the idea of their being ‘receptive’ or 
‘unreceptive’ contexts to change.79 Research based upon longitudinal study of QI 
collaboratives has built upon this concept to develop a framework for understanding the 
relationship between context, improvement and sustainability.80 Identifying six key contextual 
‘challenges’ (structural, political, cultural, learning, emotional, technical), this framework 
proposes a corresponding set of sustainability issues (fragmentation, inertia, evaporation, 
amnesia, energy sink/fade out, exhaustion).80 This framework places heavy emphasis upon 
structural planning and formalisation processes.80 Relating this to our findings, and over and 
above the obvious differences between the approach taken at each site, there is good 
evidence of a formal and structured approach to planning and leadership of change having 
been undertaken in both sites, with clearly articulated and results-oriented planning from the 
start, data and monitoring systems established to track process and outcomes, and both 
formal and informal procedures for benchmarking and communication.  
Of the two approaches, Hospital Y was the more ‘top down’ and structured, through the 
formal allocation of roles and division of labour between specialists and generalists. This 
was effective in clearly linking the physical, human and organisational resource required for 
the change to be made. A sustainability challenge arises out of the concentration of 
knowledge among so few people, and the dependence this creates upon the individuals 
involved. This placed great emphasis on the hand-over of care from the specialists to the 
ward teams. 
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We draw out three further key aspects of the implementation of changes in each site and 
relate them to this sustainability framework: 
1. Educational challenge and the risk of amnesia 
There is a sustainability challenge related to the tension noted above, between improvement 
driven by a commitment to accumulative learning and one, more driven by performance 
management. The collaborative approach placed a heavy ‘educational’ (and ‘political’ and 
‘emotional’) burden upon participants, who were required to absorb materials delivered in 
quite didactic fashion, and then turn these reflectively upon their own everyday work and 
consider barriers and solutions. There is likely to be a substantial degree of variance in the 
extent to which individuals take to such work, however, once ideals have been practiced 
through the programme, then one would expect there to be a reduced chance of ‘amnesia’ at 
least for those who have actively participated in the programme. However, once the 
programme moves away to non-participating teams, then the educational challenge could 
well be much more similar to the experience of the nurse specialists in Hospital Y, 
attempting to ‘educate’ ward teams and encountering sustained resistance. This means 
there is a resource dependency associated with the collaborative participants, which is 
similar in character to the dependency upon the nurse specialists, though it is distributed 
among a greater number of people. 
2. Technical challenge and the risk of exhaustion 
As we have noted at various points, the two organisations took divergent paths regarding 
their adoption of the e alert and their use of technology in integrating the alert and care 
processes into practice. The reliance in Hospital Y on the nurses to undertake daily 
monitoring and correcting of the alert creates a resource dependency for the continued 
integrity of this system. The approach taken in Hospital X required translational work 
devoted to integrating the alert into the EPR, and developing the alert and bundle process 
based upon a close examination of ward practices. Therefore, technology played an 
important role in the delivery and potential long-term effectiveness of the bundle approach in 
Hospital X. 
Nevertheless, as noted in Section 4.3, the over- and under-identification that is inherent to 
the alert creates an ongoing sustainability challenge, in the continuing reliance that the use 
of the alert has on human resources: time, awareness and clinical judgement. Such 
resources are subject to variability as well as to future modifications and adaptations to Work 
as Done.30 
3. Political challenge and the risk of inertia 
The distributed nature of AKI drove the collaborative effort in Hospital X towards making AKI 
‘everybody’s business’. This encountered political challenges, firstly in engaging staff to 
participate in the programme and then to maintain that commitment over time in the face of 
resource pressures. Allied to this, a further political challenge was faced in the role of 
programme participants as ‘links to their ward teams. If only one or two members of a 
particular ward were participating in the programme, and/or there was resistance from 
participant’s clinical teams, then this made it more difficult for the proposed changes to be 
embedded in all areas to the same degree. The future challenge with this approach will be 
the extent to which the change package itself and demonstrable success of the collaborative 
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can face the potential political challenges of spreading changes to non-participating wards, 
who might not consider AKI ‘their business’. 
Nevertheless, the improvement culture in Hospital X perhaps helped create a context 
receptive to this approach, and this might also be expected to also soften some of the 
political challenges. This can be contrasted with the requirement to demonstrate evidence of 
effect prior to ongoing investment, which drove a more formal and structured approach. 
Assuming the resource upon which this approach depends is sustained, the improvement 
should be as well.  
5.2.5 Patient Engagement in QI 
Although there is strong rhetorical support for the involvement of patients in quality and 
safety initiatives, evidence about the role of patient involvement in quality improvement is 
limited.81-83 Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that there is considerable 
ambiguity concerning the appropriate role of patients in QI and the appropriate and effective 
methods for their involvement. Successful approaches are based upon clarity of rationale, 
identifying ‘fit’ between the model adopted and the desired outcomes, and identifying clear 
and meaningful roles and responsibilities for patients.81  
Although we note the absence of such an approach within the programmes under 
examination, it is clear from previous research that this is far from unusual. The research 
literature on quality and safety more generally also lacks a discussion of the specificities of 
particular conditions. One might find such a discussion in relation to cancer, for example, 
however, this is a condition which have received sustained funding and attention from policy 
and research, and which over many years has built a collective understanding of its 
importance, and a collective identity for those associated with it. AKI lacks this history, and 
this collective understanding, and our findings suggest that building this will require attention 
to the distributed and transient character of AKI, which challenges the formation of a 
coherent identity and the mobilisation of individuals and resources around it. These issues 
reinforce the importance of co-development and co-production between providers and 
patients in the development of more inclusive QI approaches. 
5.3 Implications for improvement research, policy and practice 
The ultimate organisational goal when implementing new policies and approaches is to 
maximise the effectiveness and utility, while minimising the burden, created by the 
introduction of the new practice or process. Achieving this in practice takes considerable 
work. We suggest that greater attention is required to understanding and supporting this 
work in order to ensure that policy and guidance is realistic in its scope and ambition and in 
order to better support organisations to realise these ambitions in practice.  
  The success of both approaches to quality improvement depended largely on their 
‘institutional fit’. Organisations that seek to replicate the success of these 
organisations should give careful consideration to the local characteristics of their 
organisation and its similarity to the two hospitals described in this report; 
 Each programme required a great deal of work from managers and clinical staff. 
However, due to the different ways in which QI can be embedded within 
organisational structures, and role allocations, it is very difficult to put a discrete 
financial value on this kind of work. This can lead to a tendency to render the ongoing 
work of making and maintaining improvements invisible. This problem can be 
exacerbated by external organisational pressures and compounded by the existence 
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of competing improvement priorities. Consideration should be given to how this work 
can be made more visible at the organisational level to guide resource planning, and 
at the system level, so that the implementation of new policies and guidelines is 
guided by a realistic understanding of the translational work required to embed them 
in organisations; 
 Unanticipated external resource pressures can result in a reordering of priorities as 
QI programmes progress. Whilst more ‘exploitative’ QI programmes (Hospital Y) re-
prioritisation is explicit, in collaborative working, re-prioritisation can be more subtle. 
This can lead to unacknowledged shifts from exploration to more target driven 
approaches. As evident with the introduction of the CQUIN in Hospital X, careful 
consideration needs to be given to reprioritisation so as to avoid undermining the 
logics on which collaborative working is based. The need for reprioritisation might 
emerge as part of ongoing QI work and might require flexibility and ability to work 
around formal processes. 
 Target driven performance incentives such as CQUINs focus on specific practices 
and areas of care, and as such can be effective in mobilising resources and clinical 
interest around particular issues. However, CQUINs do not necessarily open up an 
area of care for examination and improvement, which means there is no way of 
knowing if the attention that is given to meeting the CQUIN target results in an 
improved process of care. This means there is a risk that interest in a particular area 
grows and then fades again once the target is achieved. This highlights the 
problematic relationship between performance management and quality 
improvement consistent with findings related to pay-for-performance systems in other 
sectors (e.g. the Quality Outcomes Framework in primary care).65 66 
 While both programmes were driven through by key people, the collaborative placed 
a greater emphasis on distributed responsibility, devolving a certain amount of 
influence to front line staff, and in return, requiring ongoing engagement from them. 
The change agent approach is in some respects the opposite of this. Here there is a 
great dependence on the individuals actually enacting the improvement – i.e. the 
specialist nurses. If there was one key issue in Hospital X it was the ongoing 
engagement of participants in the programme. If there was one key issue in Hospital 
Y it was the hand over from specialists to the ward-based teams. Resource planning 
for QI needs to take careful account of the ongoing political and cultural challenge 
that these key issues raise.  
 Given the possible actions afforded by the AKI e-alert, any approach to introducing 
the alert must consider the mobilisation of dedicated resources towards identifying 
and correcting any under- and over- diagnosis.  
 The limited extent to which primary care could be considered and incorporated into 
the improvement work of either site means that further work needs to be done in 
order to understand and improve the discharge process and ongoing interface 
between acute and continuing care provision; 
 The limited extent to which patients were meaningfully involved in improvement 
activities in either site means further work needs to be done in order to understand 
the diverse needs of this patient group, particularly in light of organisational 
pressures towards earlier discharge of patients with AKI.   
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7. Appendix 1: Project support provided to Hospital X 
NIHR CLAHRC GM provided a project manager, facilitation and administrative support to the 
Hospital X QI team. This team was comprised of individuals employed within the NHS, and 
was separate to the research team, which was based at the University. The two teams met 
on a monthly basis to discuss project progress, however, the NHS team did not collect or 
analyse any of the data drawn upon in this report. 
The NHS team facilitated the following AKI related activities;  
Facilitation, planning and delivery of meetings and events: 
 AKI working group, AKI collaborative link nurse study day and lunch meetings 
 Collaborative learning sessions 
 Facilitating weekly sub group meetings in assessment unit 
 
Assistance with local QI activities: 
 Support delivery of collaborative tests of change 
 Arranging regular ward rounds and follow up actions 
 Collating audit data, tests of change and feeding back to clinical teams 
 Reporting of e-learning module completion at Working Groups and Link Nurses 
events 
 Assisting wards with producing materials (e.g. magnets, aide memoirs) 
 Facilitating procurement of equipment for tests of change (e.g. urine syringe packs) 
 
Communications and engagement: 
 Attendance at regional AKI collaborative meetings to learn from/share learning 
 Visits to other NHS trusts in the region who were also undertaking AKI improvement 
work  
 Assistance in production of print/media (e.g. conference posters, promotional video) 
 Production of blogs and communication pieces for websites and social media 
 Assistance with World Kidney Day activities 
 
Hospital Y did not receive any dedicated project management support from the NIHR 
CLAHRC GM team. However, both sites received the same level of research resource. 
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